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Abstract 
During the last two decades, Turkey has reoriented its focus of foreign policy. From 
being a close ally to the U.S. and Israel, who both guaranteed Turkey’s security in a 
threatening neighbourhood, Turkey is now more than ever making independent and 
unilateral decision within its foreign policy. This master’s thesis deals with this 
complex change of focus.  
The main argument of this thesis is that the Turkish foreign policy has changed 
immensely since the end of the Cold War and offers an explanation to these changes 
by using both realism and constructivism from the International Relations theoretical 
framework. This is done by providing a three-stage-analysis, which consists of an 
assessment of the domestic, regional and systemic environment that Turkey is in. 
By using primary and secondary literature, the thesis presents both its own 
assessment and analysis of relevant statements from articles; however, these 
assessments are backed by a wide selection of established scholars in order to 
assure the credibility of the thesis. 
Finally, this thesis concludes that the focus of Turkish foreign policy has changed 
since the end of the Cold War, and that this change can primarily be explained by 
applying constructivist theory to the empirical findings. That being said, there still 
exists both realism and other theoretical frameworks that can add to the 
explanation, however, the primary change is explained through constructivism. 
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1. Introduction 
’Turkey has ceased to follow a uni-dimensional foreign policy as defined through the 
perspective of the NATO alliance and U.S. interests (…)’ (Oktav (2011), p. 1). This 
statement by Özden Zeynep Oktav immediately exemplifies the change that Turkey 
has been experiencing over the last decades since the Cold War ended. After a long 
period of undivided loyalty towards its Western allies, Turkey has again taken centre 
stage in international relations. The attacks on September 11 and the increasing 
unease within the Muslim community have made Turkish support for the West more 
important than ever. With this master thesis, I will clarify whether or not a change 
has occurred in Turkish foreign policy since the Cold War ended. By doing this, my 
objective is to explain the change through realism and constructivism. 
 
Turkey has historically been a nation that had to work within a large threat 
environment. It has undergone a change from being the leader of the Muslim world 
during the Ottoman Empire, to become a follower of the West. During the Ottoman 
period, large parts of the Middle East were under Ottoman control, and the Sultan 
was also the Caliph. Then followed the revolt, and the Ottoman Empire was 
reformed by Mustafa Kemal into the Turkish republic that exists today. 
 
By looking at the map below, it is evident that Turkey is geographically located 
between many cultures. It borders to Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, Georgia, 
Iran, Syria and Iraq. This diverse set of neighbours has had an immense influence on 
Turkey’s history as well as its foreign policy. The extended threat environment has 
been a major challenge for Turkey, and has often left the Eurasian state exposed to 
conflicts. According to Öniz and Yilmaz ‘The prominent strategist Brzezinski portrayed 
Euroasia as a “grand chessboard”, where both regional and global actors compete 
arduously to enhance their geostrategic and economic interests’ (Öniz & Yilmaz 
(2009), p. 8).  
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During the reformations by Kemal (Atatürk), Turkey became western oriented and 
history reveals a Turkey that neglected and dismissed its Muslim heritage and 
instead adopted a more Western and European identity. Not only was secularism 
introduced to Turkish society, which was largely unnatural and unconventional to a 
Muslim country, but European lifestyle and legislation were also directly adopted as 
it was considered modern and intelligent. The dismissal of Muslim identity in the 
1920s still plays a substantial role to this day, and the struggle over Islam has been 
the major political theme throughout the history of the Turkish republic. Secularism 
has been debated heavily, and it has had great consequences in the form of military 
coups and violent revolts.  
 
Relying solely on western values for the formation of state identity has also been 
influential on Turkish foreign policy making (Oktav (2011); Linden et al (2012); 
Larrabee (2007)). With Turkey’s focus on western identity, it was only natural that 
Turkey sided with the West after the end of World War II, and Turkey remained a 
loyal ally to the West throughout the Cold War. The bi-polar system, with the U.S. on 
one side and the Soviet Union on the other, pushed Turkey further towards 
alignment with the West and ultimately made Turkey the United States’ extended 
arm in the Middle Eastern region. With few exceptions, the Turkish government 
remained positive towards the West throughout the Cold War and continued the 
precedence set by Atatürk.  
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In the post-Cold-War period and especially after the AK Party was elected in 2002, 
Turkish foreign policy has turned its point of focus. Turkey is now increasingly 
focusing on its immediate neighbourhood, and this thesis will show that Turkey has 
become much more independent in the use of its foreign policy. Fuller argues that 
‘for most Arabs, the election of a mildly Islamist party in Ankara exemplified that 
countries, which shares common heritage and history can unite one day’ (Fuller 
(2008), p. 72). Kösebalaban indicates that Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu’s policy 
target is for Turkey to ‘assert itself as a central player in the region by playing a 
mediatory role in the conflicts between its allies and neighbours’ (Kösebalaban 
(2011), p. 94). These statements are at the heart of the investigation of this thesis. 
By using both realism and constructivism, I will analyse the change in Turkish foreign 
policy and attempt to explain these changes through the chosen theoretical 
framework.  
1.2 Problem statement 
After the introduction above my problem statement can now be presented: 
 
How can the post-Cold-War change in Turkish foreign policy be explained? 
The question will be answered with focus on realism and constructivism theory 
within the IR framework. 
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2. The Research Method 
In the following chapter, I will describe and present my methodological reflections as 
to how an answer to my problem formulation will be presented in the most optimal 
way. This is mainly done to introduce the working process and to present an 
overview to the reader, as to how my findings will be presented. Moreover it is done 
to show how I understand and approach the literature and knowledge I have 
obtained during the writing process.  
2.1 Definition of Terms 
A few terms seems reasonable to clarify, as their meaning might raise questions to 
the reader: 
Realism and Constructivism: These terms are to be understood within the IR-
framework, and are only used to explain the actions and choices that given state 
makes. 
AKP: The term AKP stands for Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, which is translated as The 
Justice and Development Party (JDP) in English. This thesis has chosen to use the 
Turkish term AKP throughout. 
Lacism: A path of secularism, ‘in which religion is seen as an adversary and an 
impediment to modern politics’. 
Tanzimat reforms: The Tanzimat era from 1839 to 1876 was intended to modernize 
the Turkish society by emulating western ideals. 
Treaty of Sévres: A treaty signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies after 
World War I that divided the Ottoman Empire between western nations 
Caliph: The title for the ruler of the Islamic Ummah. 
Deep state issue: The deep state issue is similar to that of a state within a state, and 
describes how an entity within the state, such as the military, ’has its own agenda 
other than the coming and going elected governments, and tries to achieve its goals 
by forcing the limit of legality and violate it, if necessary (Hurriyet Daily News (29 
December 2012)). 
2.2 Choice of Theory 
To explain the recent change in Turkey’s foreign policy during the last ten years, both 
realism and constructivism will be used, however they will not only be used as 
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separate paths of analysis. Instead the two will also be used to complement each 
other, and a large part of the theoretical chapter will be a discussion of the two 
rather than a simple presentation. Realism is considered by some scholars to be 
unsuccessful in explaining the Middle Eastern relations, such as the work of Michael 
N. Barnett who states: ‘Realism’s inability to explain regional stability, the strategic 
interactions between Arab states, and the fragmentation in Arab politics are not 
simply inconvenient omission but severe theoretical deficiencies’ (Barnett (1998), p. 
4). This thesis agrees with this point of view, as a pure realist analysis of Turkish 
foreign policies would leave many questions unanswered.  
 
To answer some of these questions, constructivism is brought into the analysis, 
which is mainly done because realism completely leaves out factors such as religion, 
history and identity. These factors are all vital to include when dealing with a Muslim 
state such as Turkey, especially considering the nation’s turbulent past, and the fact 
that it is situated in a conflicted region such as the Middle East. Furthermore, the 
background chapter of Turkey shows how much religion and identity have been an 
issue over centuries, which is why constructivism is important to include. It is 
important to note that realism and constructivism are not seen as entirely conflicting 
paths of international relations theories for this thesis, but rather should both be 
seen as part of a synthesis to deliver a more complete, thorough and broad analysis. 
 
The theory chapter will start out by exploring the basics of both realism and 
constructivism, and a clear definition of both theories will be established. This is 
focussed upon because a clear definition is of great importance to give a clear 
analysis of the foreign policy in Turkey. Both theories have had dense research, and 
there have been created, what Samuel Barkin (2010) calls, paradigmatic castles, 
where scholars have become preoccupied with their own version of either 
constructivism or realism. It is therefore important to include several sources as well 
as staying open minded towards different versions of both theories. At the same 
time, this creates difficulties for the theoretical chapter, mainly because of the many 
varieties of both theories. It can be very difficult to navigate between the many 
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perceptions of both constructivism and realism, which again confirms the 
importance of having clear definitions to work with.  
 
The theoretical chapter is split into three sections. First, realism is explored; realism 
theory is one of the most discussed and used theories within international relations, 
and the section will attempt to capture the basic points so that it can be used at a 
later stage. Second, constructivism is presented; as with realism, constructivism has 
been used and researched extensively, and it can be hard to navigate between the 
different scholars and their paradigmatic castles. Therefore, it is the aim to present 
the two in a broad sense, while still being as concrete as possible. The third and final 
section of this chapter will discuss the two theories, and attempt to clarify in what 
way they interact and coexist. It is the aim of this chapter to clarify how decisions in 
the political sphere are not only made by using either realism or constructivism, but 
can often be explained by more than one theoretical approach. 
2.3 Methodology 
This section will explain the way I have chosen to answer my problem formulation, 
which is ultimately my goal. The method is merely a set of considerations and 
evaluations done to optimize my path of research as to how my problem formulation 
will be answered best. I have chosen to use a qualitative approach to elucidate my 
problem area, as I argue it offers the best understanding of how states interact with 
each other (Bryman (2004), p. 266). There are many ways of obtaining qualitative 
data. The focus of this thesis will mainly be to use primary literature and secondary 
literature. The primary literature is found in newspaper articles that have reported 
and quoted Turkish, Israeli, Iranian and American officials. Through these quotes, it is 
the objective of the thesis to show a shift in Turkish foreign policy. The secondary 
sources are used as a form of support to the arguments presented here. As 
mentioned, Turkish foreign policy has experienced dense research throughout time, 
and I will therefore use the large scope of the secondary literature to evaluate, 
confirm and comment on my own assessments.  
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First and foremost, it is important to understand that I will be making use of 
different events in Turkish history, which best support my argument, that there has 
been a shift in the way the Turkish government conducts foreign policy. These 
events or snapshots are focussed on the time period from the end of the Cold War to 
2011. The reason I have chosen to limit my research period to 2011 is because the 
Middle East as a region, has been experiencing enormous changes the last two years. 
These changes, such as the Arab spring, the tense relationship between Turkey and 
Syria etc. have affected the dynamics of the region in a substantial way. However it 
is my argument that the limited literature available would not be wide enough to 
offer a full analysis. Moreover it would have demanded a large quantity of pages to 
research this part of Middle East politics and it would have removed focus from the 
main issue of this thesis. 
 
Finally, this thesis process’ data through a hermeneutic approach meaning that it 
interprets and attempts to explain the actions of states through the use of theory. I 
work retrospectively in order to evaluate the decisions made by Turkey’s 
government. Turkey’s foreign policy has often been analysed from a realism angle, 
but there seems to be less dense research done within the constructivist framework. 
This thesis hopes to contribute to the research, as it argues that the constructivist 
argument does carry substantial weight.     
2.4 Empirical Findings 
As mentioned, my empirical findings will mostly consist of primary sources and 
secondary sources in the form of relevant newspaper articles, doctrines and quotes 
from state officials. The sources are selected on the basis of the following four 
criteria: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. This ensures that 
the empirical findings live up to a certain standard, and that the analysis is based on 
findings that are strong enough to explain the real world (Bryman (2004), p. 381). 
 
It has not been possible for me to engage in interviews with experts, which could 
have been helpful. However, the large literature base that this topic offers has been 
compensating the lack of interviews. It has been possible to evaluate Turkish foreign 
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policy from several angles without engaging in interviews, and it is therefore not 
been considered a problem.  
 
The lack of relevant literature, which offers a constructivist approach, has been 
somewhat of an issue for the thesis. Therefore, a large portion of the constructivist 
analysis has been made by applying the theoretical framework to the primary 
sources. However, it has been a challenge to find secondary resources that could 
back up the arguments presented here. 
2.5 Limitations 
In order to make a precise and focussed analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy, it has 
been necessary to make strict limitations because of the complex situation Turkey is 
facing. First of all, it has been necessary to focus the analysis on the post-Cold-War 
period, because I argue that this is where the most substantial change can be 
identified. Moreover, I have decided to limit my research period to include only 
1990-2011. The revolts, which many Muslim/Middle Eastern nations have 
experienced as a consequence of the Arab spring, have had great impact on the 
bilateral diplomatic ties. Especially the relationship between Turkey and Syria has 
suffered and could have been include in this thesis. However, as argued in the 
empirical findings paragraph, post 2011 conflicts and incidents have been left out as 
a direct consequence of lack of literature and material. I argue that I would have 
been unable to make a qualified argumentation on the basis of this literature. 
 
Furthermore, I have chosen to focus my analysis on domestic changes, the changes 
in the relationship with Israel and Iran as well as the changed relationship with the 
U.S. The inclusion of relations with the European Union would have been an obvious 
choice, and I would like to acknowledge the impact that ties with the European 
Union have upon Turkish politics. The entire debate regarding Turkish candidacy and 
admission to the Union is highly topical and carry a great deal of weight in the 
Turkish political debate. However, I argue that this would have removed focus and 
would have changed the entire structure of the thesis. The scope of the debate 
would have redirected the attention in a different direction. Therefore, I have opted 
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to limit the attention on relations with the EU and instead focus on relations with 
the U.S., because I argue that the relationship is more tangible, concrete and 
suitable for analysis.  
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3. Secularism and Turkey 
Before beginning the background material on Turkey’s history and the way that non-
secularist groups have interacted with secularist groups, it is important to clarify the 
concept of secularism in Turkey, and in what way this concept has been incorporated 
in Turkish politics. During the past decade, the debate has not been about whether 
or not secularism should be present in the Turkish state; ‘Instead, the debate takes 
place around the proper definition and practice of secularism and the role of religion 
(Islam) in the public sphere’ - (Topal (2011), p. 1).  
 
The concept of secularism is in no way the main focus of this thesis, however it has 
throughout history been an important factor in Turkish politics and is still to a large 
extent being debated today, especially after AKP was elected in government. This 
section is to be seen as an introduction to the background chapter on Turkish 
political history. By using relevant literature, the two most relevant forms of 
secularism, namely lacism (the French model) and Judeo-Christian/Anglo-Saxon (also 
the American model) (Hurt (2008)) & (Topal (2011)) are discussed, and afterwards it 
will be clarified how the two have influenced secularism in Turkey. What is especially 
important to notice in this section is how secularism seems to have changed in 
Turkey since being the first Muslim country to introduce secularism to its 
constitution. It is exactly this change that this section will attempt to put forward, as 
I argue it to be relevant to the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy. 
3.1 Two paths of secularism 
There is little discussion of how secularism was introduced to the Turkish society. It 
can be argued, and will be later on, that the first secularist initiatives were made 
during the mid-1800s in the era of the Ottoman Empire during the introduction of 
the Westernisation policies. (Topal (2011), p. 5) However, secularism as a concept 
did not enter the Turkish political debate before Mustafa Kemal began to reform the 
Turkish nation in the 1920s. The initial Turkish form of secularism called Laiklik was 
built upon the French secularist direction of Laicité or laicism in English. It was a 
separationist model which is described by Hurd (2008) as a path of secularism, ‘in 
which religion is seen as an adversary and an impediment to modern politics’. In 
other words, this means that religion is obstructing politics from functioning fully, 
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and therefore has to be removed from the political system and the nation state. The 
state must be protected from the influence of religion. The abolishing of the 
caliphate, the closure of all madrasas (Islamic higher education institutions), and the 
adoption of European codes of law instead of Sharia are all examples of how 
Mustafa Kemal and his followers wanted to sanitize the Turkish political system of 
religious influence (Topal (2011), p. 4).  
 
However, the Turkish form of laicism is not as rigid as the French form. The 
establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, as well as the state project to 
offer an official form of Islam to the public, do not fit into the separationist model 
that made the Turkish form unique. Laicism, for the Kemalist elite, was the linkage 
between the objective and the subjective processes of secularization - a linkage 
operating from above, from state to society. The assumption was that the strict 
separation between the state and religion and the constitutionally based control of 
religious activities would eventually give rise to the acceptance and dissemination of 
the laicist identity-formation in Turkish society (Keyman (2007) p. 222).  
 
The other of the two paths of secularism is the Anglo-Saxon/Judeo-
Christian/American model (from now on the American model). Hurd (2008) 
describes this model as ‘a secularist trajectory, in which religion is seen as a source of 
unity and identity that generates conflict in modern international politics’. By far the 
largest chasm between the two paths is that the French model is a tool for the state 
to protect individuals from religion, whereas the American model protects the 
religion from the state and the state from religion (Topal (2011), p. 3). The American 
model is much more lenient towards the separation of religion and state, whereas 
the French model sees the two as fully separate. Hurd (2008) uses former American 
President George W. Bush, as an example of this form of secularism. ‘The United 
States, for Bush, is empowered by a transcendental authority. It is a secular republic 
that is realizing (a Christian) God’s will’ (Hurd (2008), p. 38).  To exemplify this, Hurd 
uses Bush’s second inaugural address in 2005, when he described his commitment to 
human rights as founded in the belief ‘that every man and woman on this earth… 
bear(s) the image of the Maker of Heaven and Earth’ (Hurd (2008), p. 37) This grey 
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area between strictly separating state and religion, while still using religion for 
political purposes, exemplifies the difference between the French and the American 
model well. 
 
The brief discussion of different forms of secularism adds to the foundation and the 
basic knowledge of Turkey, which is important to understand, the later analysis of 
Turkish foreign policy. To extend and further this foundation, the upcoming chapter 
will deliver background knowledge on the Turkish state. Although a strict 
chronological listing of events throughout Turkish history might seem unnecessary, I 
argue that the complex nature of Turkey’s history and the influence of religion are of 
critical importance.   
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4. From Empire to Republic 
Because of the influence that history and past events have had on Turkish politics 
today, and because the history of Turkey is highly complex, I will use the following 
chapter to deliver background information on the nation located between Europe 
and Asia. The background information is included to describe how Turkey went from 
being a sultanate to a republic, but also to emphasise and clarify the way the Islamic 
influences historically have been battling secular groups. The objective of this section 
is to shed light on the state building process in Turkey, as it has had a major impact 
on the way the Turks have interacted with their surroundings. The research of this 
thesis deals with the change in recent Turkish foreign policies, in which there seems 
to have been a shift from increasing westernisation since the 1920s to the 
development of a much closer relationship with the neighbouring countries in the 
Middle East region. In order to problematise this shift, the background material of 
the Turkish state in the following chapter cannot be left out, as it helps to explain the 
recent alleged change of course. 
 
This chapter includes a chronological overview of the way Turkey’s history has 
progressed. The chapter starts by exploring the Ottoman Empire and while this 
might seem extensive, the Ottoman Empire plays a role in the debate even to this 
day. Afterwards, the ideals and ideas of Mustafa Kemal are explored. Not only was 
he nicknamed Atatürk (Father of the Turks), but he played a major role in the state 
building process, and his ideas are still referred to as the foundation of the Turkish 
state today. The last section of the chapter explores and presents the political 
debate in Turkey after Mustafa Kemal’s death. There are many ways of doing so; 
however, the emphasis for this thesis is Turkey’s struggle over the role of Islam and 
Turkey’s relationship with the West. 
4.1 1400’s – 1920’s: The Rise and Fall of The Ottoman Empire  
The Ottoman Empire was established when the East Roman capital of 
Constantinople was conquered by Mehmet II on 31 may 1453. The Ottomans named 
their new capital Istanbul, and it marked the birth of a new great empire (Sørensen 
& Boel (2005), p. 19). In the decades to come, large parts of the Middle East, 
Northern Africa, and Southeast Europe were conquered, and the Empire developed 
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into a major entity in the Islamic world. Religion and Islam had an enormous impact 
on the Ottoman Empire, not only were the religious leaders very influential, but they 
had a mediating role between state and society in a system which dictated that all of 
society was natural subjects to the Sultan. (Sørensen & Boel (2005), p. 21).  
 
When the expansion of the Ottoman Empire finally ended in 1683 after the Ottoman 
army suffered a great defeat outside of Vienna, the Empire continued to play an 
interesting part in world politics, especially in Europe. Europe became an object of 
both admiration and hate for the Ottomans. Hate because Europe had by now 
already overtaken the Empire on areas they previously had excelled in, but at the 
same time admiration because the Sultan and the Empire started to emulate 
Western ideals and ideas of modernisation. Most important of these reforms were 
the ‘Tanzimat reforms’. The Tanzimat era from 1839 to 1876 was intended to 
modernise the Turkish society by emulating Western ideals.  An example of this 
emulation and admiration of the West can be found in two of the reforming decrees  
introduced by the Ottoman central government in the 1800s. Both the Rose Garden 
Decree of 1839 and the Imperial Rescript of 1856 were aimed to win continued 
Western European economic and political support (Howard (2001), p. 60). The Rose 
Garden Decree declared that the Sultan ‘guarenteed the life, property, and honor of 
all Ottoman subjects and the equality of all before the law, regardless of religious 
affiliation’ (Howard 2001, p. 60), which to say the least, was inspired by the new 
constituitons in Europe following the French Revolution. The reforms, introduced by 
the Sultan in the 1800s, show the foundation of the project, which Atatürk later 
build upon. It is therefore especially important to notice that the modernisation 
project of Turkey can not be acredited to Atatürk alone. 
 
Not all groups of society were happy with this emulation of Western values, because 
orthodox adherers to Islam blamed this westernisation for the fall of the Empire. 
They argued that the former great Muslim empire had lost its roots as a direct result 
of neglecting islam (Sørensen & Boel (2005), p. 22). A sense of nationalism  began to 
rise within the Ottoman empire. Especially the Ottoman Christians were accused of 
exploiting the rules and regulations of the empire, and this added to the frustration 
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Muslim groups had had after the poor performance and defeat to non-Muslim 
powers (Howard (2001), p. 64). The Ottoman Empire was regressing, and Muslim 
movements within the empire blamed the West. 
 
Several groups of Muslim modernisers emerged over the next decade. These groups 
primarily argued that Islam needed to be reformed in order for it to fit into the 
Ottoman society. Most prominent among these were the Young Ottomans. The 
Young Ottomans had organized in the mid 1860s, and was led by Namik Kemal, who 
brought together Islam and constituionalism. The formation of the Young Ottomans 
was a response to the new decreasing role that the Ottomans now played in world 
politics. The Empire was referred to as ‘the sick man of Europe’ by other great 
powers such as Russia and England, and it had created a sort of inferiority feeling 
among the Ottoman population. The Young Ottomans believed that constitutional 
liberty and Islamic holy law were not only compatible but mutually reinforcing 
(Howard (2001), p.68). Although the Young Ottomans introduced a new constitution 
to the Empire in 1876, it quickly seemed clear that the control of the Empire was in 
the hands of the Sultan, and that he had no intention of introducing a constitutional 
monarchy. Sultan Abdülhamid, who was Sultan of the Ottoman Empire at the time, 
dismissed the parliament and suspended the constitution indefinitely in 1877, not 
more than a year after it had been authored by the Young Ottomans. The parliament 
did not meet for the remaining thirty years of Sultan Abdülhamid rule, which meant 
that the changes introduced by the Young Ottomans essentially did not carry any 
weight. 
 
When junior officers of the Ottoman Third Army mutinied in 1908, they demanded a 
restoration of the 1876 Ottoman constitution, which had been suspended by the 
Sultan. They formed a group, the Young Turks, who were to have a great impact on 
the modern history of Turkey (Howard (2001), p. 73).  After the mutiny in 1908, they 
threatened to march in to Istanbul, after which the Sultan capitulated to their 
demands. The group had two primary key issues: They wanted to promote and 
increase the role of islam, and they wanted to increase the possibility of geographic 
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expassion. This group of young officers was influenced by nationalism which led to 
several bloody years following their take over. Non-sunni Muslims like the Greek and  
Armenian parts of the population felt threatened and left out by the new leaders of 
the Empire and therefore revolted against them, leaving The Ottoman Empire 
unstable and unbalanced.  
 
After World War I was concluded, the Ottoman Empire saw themselves on the 
loosing side with Germany. As a consequence to their defeat in Wordl War I, a large 
portion of the Ottoman Empire was distributed to France, Britain and others as a 
result of the Sévres-treaty, and left the once so proud empire in ruins (Sørensen & 
Boel (2005), p. 25). After the Sévres Treaty was agreed, The Ottoman Empire saw to 
the United States to accept a mandate over Istanbul, the Straits and the six provinces 
of the Empire, however, the Americans did little to help. 
 
4.2 1922 – 1938: Mustafa Kemal – The Father of the Turks 
The influence that Mustafa Kemal has had on the reformation of what we today 
know as Turkey can hardly be questioned. His reforms had an almost mythological 
status, and his influence can still be felt in the country to this day. What is referred 
to as Kemal’s revolution is a defining element in modern Turkey’s self-perception 
(Sørensen & Boel (2005), p. 28). The changes he introduced were of significant 
nature, as when he decided to move the nation’s capital from the historic city of 
Istanbul to the small town of Ankara.  
 
Religion, Islam and secularism were without a doubt at the heart of Mustafa Kemal’s 
state building process. He advocated the complete autonomy of the nation and the 
sovereignty of the people in a secular ‘people’s democracy’. Walker writes about 
Kemal: ‘he set about constructing a new state that sought to cut many ties with its 
pre-republican past and rejsct all things Ottoman’ (Linden et al (2012), p. 18). 
Mustafa Kemal wanted to put the Sultan (who was also the caliph) completely out of 
influence; mainly because he argued that the Sultan had betrayed the nation when 
he signed the Treaty of Sévres. In 1922, the Parliament voted to abolish the 
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sultanate and the Sultan fled to live under British protection in November of 1922 
(Howard (2001), p. 93). Over the next two years, Kemal proceeded to abolish the 
Caliphate, the Ministry of Religious Endowment, closed down Sharia courts, mosque 
colleges, and went on a mission to eliminate the Islamic Ulema by removing the 
most important potential challenger to the new Republican nation i.e. the potential 
of an Islamic state. These initiatives were clearly inspired by the French form of 
secularism called laicism. Douglas A. Howard argues that the removal of Islam and 
especially the abolishment of the caliphate had major implications for the way the 
Turkish nation placed itself in the international system (Howard (2001), p. 94). The 
parliament had accepted the fact that Turkey was no longer a world power and the 
centre of the Islamic world as it had been for centuries. This was largely demoralising 
for many, and the new Turkish state was perceived a great deal weaker than the 
former Ottoman Empire.  
 
In 1924, Turkey got its new constitution; however, it was not as secular as Mustafa 
Kemal had hoped for. A large portion of the parliament’s members had sustained 
references to Islam in the new constitution, which had obstructed Kemal’s plans of a 
clear separatist form of secularism. By 5 April 1928, things began to progress rapidly 
when Kemal came closer to his vision of a secular state and the parliament decided 
to delete the phrase “the religion of the Turkish state is Islam” (Howard (2001), p. 
97). From 1933, it became almost impossible to study Islam and religion in general 
and by 1935 Sunday became the official weekly holiday instead of the Islamic holiday 
Friday. Furthermore, Islamic Sharia was also finally cleansed from the Turkish law. 
Instead of Islamic law, European law was copied directly from countries like 
Switzerland and Italy, and in 1937, it was stated directly in the constitution that 
Turkey was a secular state. The Europeanization of Turkey slowly began to take 
form. 
 
During his reformation of the Turkish state, Kemal had to constantly balance the 
question of religion, because large groups in Turkey still felt like the Ottoman Empire 
and Turkey had suffered its defeats earlier in history as a direct consequence of not 
living up to ‘Islamic way of life’. These groups argued that religion and Islam should 
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still be the cornerstone of Turkish society and warned the population that Mustafa 
Kemal was selling out and delivering the Turkish territory to European and Western 
powers. In the mindset of these groups, the European countries represented ‘the 
others’ and the direct opposite to the purity that was Islam.  
 
According to Kemalist ideology, Kemalism consists of six arrows, which are: 
republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, revolutionism and etatism. These 
six arrows were in direct opposition to everything the Ottoman Empire had 
represented, and were intended to prevent the new Turkish republic from falling 
back to the failure of the Ottoman Empire. Atatürk’s six arrows of state building 
were mainly ideas that had the objective to gather all Turks under one flag and one 
nation.  
 
1. Republicanism symbolised that the Turkish republic had natural borders, 
which were much narrower than the ones of the former Empire. 
2. Nationalism represented the idea that the republic should have one united 
people, thus create one common Turkish identity. To become Turkish, one 
had to be Muslim and live within the borders of the republic, which 
disqualified a large portion of the former Empire. 
3. Secularism was the cornerstone of Kemalism, which meant that religion and 
state were clearly separated (laicism), and that the republic should be based 
on nationalism instead.  
4. Populism allowed the government to strive for goals on behalf of the people 
without being challenged in their decisions. This meant that Atatürk and his 
party could work towards decisions without being challenged, because they 
had the mandate of the population. 
5. By using revolutionism as one of his six arrows, Atatürk proclaimed that the 
Turkish republic should be forever ready to adapt to ongoing change in the 
surrounding world. It also meant that the Turkish republic should be ready to 
create radical reforms if such were required. 
6. Etatism for the Turkish republic meant that the state should at all time have 
hands-on influence with large parts of the market. Especially economic 
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decisions were to be state regulated, and were far away from the free-
market model we know today. 
 
It has been established that Mustafa Kemal had a dramatic reformation in mind 
when he took over power in the early 1920’s. It has also been established that 
religion or elimination of religious influence was at the heart of his project, and 
finally it has been established that drastic measures were taken to make sure that 
the plan succeeded. Atatürk and his movement were somewhat successful in 
transforming a large multicultural Empire like the Ottoman Empire that stretched 
over large territories and many cultures. Instead they planned to create a unity 
among Turks that was built upon a strong secular foundation with Western values.  
 
This section will now briefly cover the basic tendencies in modern Turkey’s political 
history. This is mainly done in order to deliver background, which can be used at a 
later time in this thesis. The focus of the section will not be to cover every inch of 
history for Turkey. For that, the scope of this thesis and the importance of the 
history is simply too small. However, it does seem relevant to explore and describe 
how politics and in particular secularism has been functioning since Mustafa Kemal 
(Atatürk) resigned from political leadership. Since his death, there have been 
constant strains between secular and Islamic forces in Turkey, and that is what this 
section is trying to clarify. 
 
4.3 1938 – 1960: The Military Coup 
After Atatürk’s death, his loyal aid Ismet Inönü was elected president just as it had 
been planned. Inönü remained president until 1950 and was mainly remembered for 
introducing a multiparty system, which was to substitute the system in which CHP 
had been the only party on the ballot. Inönü was also the president who had the 
questionable honour of maneuvering Turkey through and around World War II. As 
presented previously, World War I had left the former Ottoman Empire in ruins. 
Fears of ending up in the same situation made Turkey remain neutral in the war, and 
Inönü waited until the end in 1945 before declaring his support to the Western 
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allies. By doing so, Turkey became member of both NATO and the United Nations, 
but literature indicates that by choosing the colonial powers from the West, Turkey 
had now alienated the Middle Eastern countries. The support of the West proved to 
the newly founded independent nation states in the Middle East region that Turkey 
had betrayed the Muslim world and chosen a path leading them west (Sørensen & 
Boel), p. 51) 
 
In 1950, the populist Democrat Party (DP) took over power from CHP and Inönü. 
They immediately began easing the religious restrictions Atatürk and CHP had 
introduced. The calls from the mosques no longer had to be written in Turkish, and 
could now also be written in Arabic just as it had been done in the Ottoman Empire. 
Other than that, religious radio broadcasting was allowed, and state funding for 
Islamic school was reintroduced. DP had to constantly battle accusations of mixing 
religion and politics and for not living up to the secular traditions the Turkish state 
was build upon. This eventually led to the first of three military coups, where the 
military suspended the constitution and executed the leader of DP and Turkey, 
Menderes (Linden et al (2012), p. 31). 
4.4 1961 – 1980: Islam becomes institutionalized 
The military had the role of protecting the ideals and ideas that Mustafa Kemal 
(Atatürk) had introduced several decades before. The military generals, who had led 
the coup, felt that the DP and Menderes had neglected the foundation of the nation 
and felt obligated to intervene. A new constitution was introduced by the military in 
1961, which was aimed at introducing a form of checks and balances to the Turkish 
political system, thereby ensuring that no one had the opportunity of securing 
monopoly of power. A Constitutional Court was formed. The courts, the press and 
the universities were made independent of state interference and the military was 
given a formal role as ‘guardian of the constitution’ (Sørensen & Boel (2005), p. 54). 
At the referendum in 1961, the constitution was passed, and a new government 
consisting of CHP and AP with Inönü as Prime Minister was introduced. Atatürk’s 
successor was again in charge of Turkey.  
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In 1968, an important political figure entered the scene when Necmettin Erbakan 
formed his new party called Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP). For the first time in Turkish 
history, a political party was very open about their religious agenda, and did not hide 
the fact that the politics of the party was firmly rooted in religious ideals. MNP was, 
however, rapidly shut down on the ground that it was against the secular nature of 
the state, and in 1972 the MSP was founded instead with the slogan: “A Great 
Turkey Once Again” (Rabasa & Larrabee (2008), p. 40). Political Islam had been 
institutionalized (Sørensen & Boel (2005), p. 56).  Milliyetci Hareket Partisi was also 
formed and had placed their emphasis on cultural nationalism and the Turkish 
language. The newly formed parties symbolized the new political order of Turkey: 
The two government parties CHP (Kemalism), AP (Conservatives) and the newly 
formed opposition ultra rightwing nationalists (MHP) and Islamic (MSP) (Sørensen & 
Boel (2005), p. 56).  
 
Throughout the 1970s, the shifting coalition governments had difficulties 
cooperating and struggled to form a united front of secularism. This became an 
opportunity for Erbakan and his Islamic party MSP, who often had the deciding vote 
whenever the coalition governments had disputes (Boel & Sørensen (2005), p. 57). In 
1974, the dispute between the secular government parties became so significant 
that CHP’s leader Ecevit, who was firmly rooted in secularism invited Erbakan to join 
him in creating a new coalition government. It was the first time an Islamic party 
joined the Turkish government and it would have been, to say the least, against 
Atatürk’s wishes. Erbakan’s way for Turkey was to return to Islam’s teaching and 
what he called a ‘Muslim way of life’ (Rabasa & Larrabee (2008), p. 42). Ecevit 
wanted to appeal to the Arab OPEC-neighbours, from whom he wanted to attract 
foreign investments to Turkey, and wanted to use Erbakan in that respect. 
4.5 1980 – 2000: The ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ 
The influence of Erbakan and other non-secular parties in Turkish politics caused 
major unease in parts of the general population and not least in the Kemalist “deep 
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state”1. So much so that the military for the third time had to intervene and suspend 
the constitution on 12 September 1980. This was officially done to secure the streets 
of Turkey; however, the timing of the intervention should be taking into account. In 
1979, the Ayatollah had just taken over power in Iran, and as a result much focus 
was on the Middle East and the influence of Islam in the region. As a consequence to 
this focus, the army had an opportunity to remove the religious Erbakan from power 
and close down the MSP (Rabasa & Larrabee (2008), p. 41); Linden et al (2012)). The 
party re-emerged in 1983 in the form of the Welfare Party or Refah Partise (RP).  
 
Ironically, the Turkish military went on to strengthen the role of political Islam in 
Turkey in the mid-1980. In an attempt to control Islamic influence on the Turkish 
society, the military introduced the concept “Islamisation from above”. It was an 
idea that was based on Ottoman-Islamic ideas and was aimed at creating a more 
homogenous and less political Islamic community, while also functioning as a 
counterpart to the flow of Islamic radicalism from Iran (Rabasa & Larrabee (2008), p. 
37). The synthesis was sending conflicting signals. The military, which had been ‘the 
protector of Kemalism’ and ‘the guardian of secularism’ was now advocating a 
stronger role of religion in schools and education, which to say the least was very un-
secular. When Turgut Özal became Prime Minister, he carried out reforms 
throughout the 1980s, which strengthened the role of Islamic groups. Özal’s 
softening of religious regulations gave Muslim groups and brotherhoods the 
opportunity to fund and found private schools and universities, as well as allowing 
access for Islamist groups’ use of media and newspapers (Rabasa & Larrabee (2008), 
p. 39). Turkey found themselves in a slippery slope far away from the teachings of 
Atatürk. 
 
                                                     
1 The term ’deep state’ in Turkey can be compared to the concept of ’the state 
within the state’ in other countries. The term covers the groups in Turkey who are 
actively seeking influence on political as well as economic decisions in the nation. 
The most influential of these groups has been the Turkish military who, for decades, 
has interfered and suppressed Islamists groups and others who has threatened the  
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In the 1995 national elections, the secular nation of Turkey experienced the biggest 
upset to date. Erbakan’s Islamic RP won the election and formed a coalition with the 
Justice Party (AP) who had previously been in a coalition with CHP. For the first time 
since 1923, Turkey was now led by a party that had values and ideals based on Islam, 
and had a Prime Minister, who shared these Islamic values (Rabasa & Larrabee 
(2008), p. 42). Erbakan’s time in office did not last for long before the military 
interfered once again. This time the National Security Council (which was primarily 
dominated by the military) forced Erbakan to step down and the Welfare Party was 
closed down in 1998.  
4.6 2000 – 2012: Muslim movements separate 
After the Welfare party had been shut down, the political Islamic community in 
Turkey debated their future. Erbakan represented the traditionalists, who opposed 
any change to the policy of the Islamic parties, while Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was 
mayor of Istanbul at the time, represented the reformists, who felt that the 
approach needed to be rethought especially in regards to democracy, human rights 
and the relationship with the West (Rabasa & Larrabee (2008), p. 45). The reformist 
founded the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) in 2001. In contrast to Erbakan and the 
traditionalist movement, the founders of the AKP were open to cooperation with the 
secular establishment and were not negative towards cooperation with the West.  
 
Although not defining itself as an Islamic party, the party and its leaders including 
Erdogan have roots in the former and more traditionalist Islamic parties that were 
run by Erbakan and others. The major difference is, however, that they do not buy in 
to Erbakans synthesis that Islam and the West cannot be combined. There remain 
disputes whether or not AKP has successfully implemented the necessary Kemalist 
traditions into Turkish law since taking power in 2002. In Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s 
book (2008), White argues that Erdogan and the AKP has introduced ‘a ‘Muslimhood’ 
model in which religious ethics inspire public service but overt religiosity is not part of 
an individual’s public political identity’ (Hurd (2008), p. 69).  This can be interpreted 
as a sign of AKP acknowledging their Muslim values, while not imposing them on 
Turkish law or on individuals. It can therefore not be said that AKP is a non-secular 
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party, however literature indicates that they seek to endorse alternative models of 
separation and accommodation between politics and religion (Hurd (2008, p. 81). 
AKP is not a secular party in the French laicism form of the word. Rhetoric and 
religious symbolism used by Erdogan and other influential party members reveal 
that Turkey has become more attracted to the American model, where religious 
symbols, metaphors and so on are more acceptable. As an example, Erdogan’s wife’s 
use of a traditional veil can be mentioned. This would be unheard of in the context 
of French laicism; however, the leniency of the American/Judeo-Christian form 
makes room for such things. Turkey’s new and more relaxed form of secularism is 
also evident in the way that they are perceived by their surroundings. Especially this 
quote from Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal is interesting: ‘Turkey has shown the 
bright face of Islam (…) Erdogan, you are not only a leader in Turkey now, you are a 
leader in the Muslim world as well’ (Al Arabia News (30 September 2012)). 
 
This quote brings up a lot of questions; however, it shows how the leaders of Turkey 
have moved towards a more lenient form of secularism than the original form of 
laicism. AKP won the 2002 elections with 34% of the vote, well ahead of the 
secularist CHP. In 2007, the support of AKP increased to 46.6% (Rabasa & Larabee 
(2008), p. 48), and in 2011, the voter support increased again to 49.83%. 
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5. Theory 
As mentioned in the beginning of this thesis, the theoretical chapter will outline the 
key points within both realism and constructivism. The two will be presented 
separately and then combined, which will present their weaknesses as well as their 
strengths. The two are not to be viewed as opposing theoretical frameworks, but 
rather as complementing. Constructivism is included to help explain the events and 
developments in Turkish history that realism fails to do. Realism on the other hand is 
in many ways helpful, as it can help explain the development during and following 
the Cold War. I will attempt to take a critical approach to both theories. By using a 
relatively large sample of literature by different scholars, I will present a wide pallet 
of opinions, in order for the presentation to be open-minded and to be anything but 
one-sided. 
5.1 Realism 
As mentioned in the Choice of Theory paragraph, there are many definitions of 
realist theory, which is mainly due to the fact, that they were all moulded by the 
structures of the international society at the time they were articulated. Classical 
realism for instance is a term used when looking into the thoughts of Thucydides, 
Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. These three were all, at their time, leading figures 
in analysing international relations, and as such deserve credit when speaking of 
realism in IR. Especially Hobbes had interesting thoughts, when researching realism 
and the security of a state. He describes human beings as being in ‘a permanent 
state of nature of every man against every man (…) life is constantly at risk and 
nobody can be confident about his or her security and survival for any reasonable 
length of time’ (Jackson & Sørensen (2007), p. 65). 
 
Hans Morgenthau, who was one of the leading realist thinkers in the twentieth 
century, wrote: ‘Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate 
aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, 
and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action’ (Jackson & 
Sørensen (2007), p. 60). He defined politics as a social science concerned with 
power, understood relationally (Barkin (2010), p. 20). What this specific form of 
realism shows is that realists see men and women as entities that have power as 
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their ultimate objective, power often being military power as opposed to 
economical, organisational or moral. It shows how realists understand international 
relations, as a struggle between the great powers for domination and security of 
their state.  
 
Thomas Schelling’s work on strategic realism mainly focuses on foreign policy 
decision-making, and especially deals with ‘how states people can deal rationally 
with the threat and dangers of nuclear war’ (Jackson & Sørensen (2007), p. 71). 
Schelling focuses mainly on diplomacy and bargaining in order to avoid the ultimate 
disaster i.e. a nuclear war between states, and notes that there is an important 
distinction between ‘taking what you want and making someone give it to you 
voluntarily’. For Schelling, the power to hurt is most successful and forceful when 
held in reserve. However, there are restrictions to this form of realist thinking. In 
order to obtain the optimal outcome of diplomacy, and for diplomacy even to be 
possible, interests of the two states have to be somewhat similar. In other words, 
there has to be a common goal in order for diplomacy and strategic realism to work. 
 
Neo-realist Kenneth Waltz was especially occupied with peace and security, and how 
to avoid war between major states. He defines war as a necessary evil: ‘Though a 
state may want to remain at peace, it may have to consider undertaking a preventive 
war, for if it does not strike (…) it may be struck later when the advantage has 
shifted’ (Waltz in Chan & Moore (2009), p. 42). This is the very core of balance of 
power theory. Kenneth Waltz distinguishes between a bipolar system and a 
multipolar system, which is dependent on how many superpowers there are in the 
international system. During the cold war, USSR and USA stood opposite each other 
representing two parts of a bipolar system. During World War II, the international 
system had several great powers such as USA, Japan, Germany, and France etc. thus 
creating a multipolar system. Waltz prefers the bipolar system, as he finds it more 
stable to have few international powers, willing to participate in wars.  
 
Waltz was very much concerned with the structure of the international system and 
argues, as opposed to classical realism, that the structure of the system dictates the 
29 
 
distribution of power rather than state leaders and human interference. Waltz 
argues that a basic feature of international relations is the decentralised structure of 
anarchy between states. As he writes in his book Theory of International Politics, 
states are similar in the way they function. They all perform the same basic tasks 
such as to collect taxes, conduct foreign policy etc.; however, they distinguish 
primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing (these) similar tasks 
(Jackson & Sørensen (2007), p. 75). To clarify, states do not have completely free 
reins to do what they want, because they are constrained by the structure of the 
international system (Little (2007), p. 173). Although all states are separate entities 
who can initiate what they want, their position in a given structure (globally, 
regionally etc.) still determines whether or not the initiation will be tolerated. Waltz 
argues that change in the international system occurs when great powers rise and 
fall and when there is a change in the balance of power. This will be elaborated 
further in the ‘Evaluation of neighbours’ strength’ section below. 
 
For offensive realist John Mearsheimer, states’ behaviour can be explained through 
the objective of maximising relative power and at the same time have ‘a smart’ 
foreign policy (Mearsheimer (2012), Interview). Maximising relative power is about 
being as powerful as a state can possibly be, often caused by the distrust that exists 
in the realist version of international relations theory. A nation state should always 
strive to become a regional hegemon who dominates its region of the world. By 
doing so, other states are less likely to attack and the chances of war decrease as a 
result. Mearsheimer argues that USA is the only state, which has a relative power 
that keeps them safe from being attacked (Mearsheimer (2012), interview: ‘Turkish 
Foreign Policy: A Realist Assessment’). The second goal is having ‘a smart’ foreign 
policy, which especially focuses on how a state deals with its threat environment. 
For a state in the Middle East like Turkey, it is very important to have a well planned 
foreign policy mainly because of the large threat environment in the region. For 
hegemonic states like the USA it becomes less important due to their large relative 
power.  
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Mearsheimer’s interpretation of realist theory computes well with parts of J. Samuel 
Barkin’s (2010) research. He defines realist power politics as ‘relative, relational, and 
social’ in his book Realist Constructivism – Rethinking International Relations Theory 
(2010). Here, Barkin describes realist power politics as being relative, rather than 
absolute, meaning that power is only meaningful relative to the power of another 
state (p. 18). Barkin uses the term relational to describe the dependency that states 
have of each other. Here Barkin uses Schelling’s approach to diplomacy, when he 
describes power politics as ‘getting other actors to do what you want them to do, 
which you can not do if you have just destroyed them’ (Barkin (2010), p. 19). In this 
context, power is about convincing rather than forcing. It should be said that 
Mearsheimer does not agree with the relational part of Barkin’s definition.  
 
Finally, power politics for realists, according to Barkin, is social (p. 19). Realists 
ascribe relational power, and therefore interests and agency, to social institutions, 
rather than to individuals. This social/constructivist aspect is also brought up by 
Waltz in his statement that ‘(…) the effects of structure are produced through 
socialization of the actors and through competition among them’ (Dunne et al 
(2006), p. 180). From this statement, it can be argued that Waltz reduces the 
importance of the anarchy of the states and structures, and thereby agreeing that 
other factors can create or develop structures. 
5.1.1 Critique of realism 
There are several critical points to realist theory. A major one of these is the 
constructivist theoretical framework, which will be elaborated further in the section 
below. As a preliminary to this chapter, it would be relevant to briefly outline some 
of these aspects that are critical of the realist theory.  
 
For Ken Booth, realism is outdated. It is no longer fully fit to explain the way the 
states operate with each other (Jackson & Sørensen (2007), p. 91). It fails to 
acknowledge that states are not only in constant conflict, but also share common 
interest that influence decision making.  Booth claims that the realist game of power 
politics and military is obsolete, because security is now a local problem i.e. a 
problem for individual humans rather than a problem for the global community. 
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Furthermore, Booth argues that realist theory puts too much emphasis on the states 
as he remarks: ‘people always come first; states are merely tools that can be 
discarded if they are no longer useful’ (Jackson & Sørensen (2007), p. 91). Another 
critical point is that realism is far too one-dimensional, and that disregards important 
factors in the international systems such as Non Governmental Organizations, 
religion, identity and history to name a few. This point leads us to the next section 
within the theoretical chapter: The presentation and discussion of constructivism. 
5.2 Constructivism  
The next section of the theory chapter will identify and present key findings in 
constructivism. The reason for including constructivism to the theory chapter of this 
thesis is to give a more complete and broader analytical foundation, as some parts of 
the change in Turkish foreign policy can not be explained through realism. The 
inclusion of constructivism should not be seen as a mere presentation of this theory 
in international relations, but rather be perceived as a counterpoint that can help 
identify and analyse the phenomena, which realism struggles to. 
 
Seeing as how a large portion of the international relations theories, and especially 
realism/neorealism (from now on realism), are often focusing solely on the 
distribution of material power, it is interesting and relevant to look at 
constructivism, as it dismisses this one-sidedness completely (Jackson & Sørensen 
(2007), p. 162). For constructivists, the most important aspect of international 
relations is not material but rather social, and the theory does not accept the realist 
argument that the system consists of structures that are impossible for states and 
actors to affect. Jackson and Sørensen describe the overall constructivist point well: 
 
 The international system (for constructivist’s ed.) is not something ‘out 
there’ like the solar system. It does not exist on its own. It exists only as an 
intersubjective awareness among people; in that sense the system is constituted by 
ideas, not by material forces’ (Jackson & Sørensen (2007), p. 162). 
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This definition is supported by J. Samuel Barkin’s research. For Barkin; ‘Social 
constructivism means that social relations make or construct people – ourselves – 
into the kinds of beings that we are’ (Barkin (2010), p. 24). This again is backed by 
Alexander Wendt, who states that: ‘anarchy is what a state makes it’ (Jackson & 
Sørensen (2007, p. 162). Finally, Adler defines constructivism as ‘the manner in 
which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction 
depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world’ 
(Zehfuss (2002), p. 7) It is therefore very clear that constructivists give states a 
responsibility and a choice when dealing with other states, and that states are not 
just acting the way structures are dictating them to do. Constructivists’ claim is that 
realism as a theoretical framework is too uncertain when foreseeing the future of 
the international system. By dividing society into a natural and a social world, the 
distinction between what is natural and what is social becomes apparent. As 
stressed by constructivists, many concepts of world politics are of ‘social fact’ since 
they only exist by the virtue of human acts of creation such as money, property 
rights and marriage. This is in direct opposition to objects of the natural world such 
as rocks and trees (Ruggie (1998), p. 856). 
 
Two important elements of social construction are intersubjectivity and co-
construction. Intersubjectivity is defined as ‘collective knowledge and understanding’ 
which can be interpreted as knowledge ‘embedded in social routines and practices as 
they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and 
workings’(Barkin (2010), p. 27). Intersubjectivity is not objective because it focuses 
on ideas and understandings by given actors. Intersubjectivity means that common 
ideas and understandings are what matters in international relations. Another way 
of explaining intersubjectivity comes from Jackson & Sørensen (2007). They describe 
intersubjectivity as ‘ideas (which) must be widely shared to matter’. In other words, 
ideas must be interpreted and shared by other actors to become important in 
international relations. The second important element is co-construction. This term 
notes that people and society construct, or constitute, each other. This means that 
constructivism does not look at how society affects individuals, nor does it look at 
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how individuals affect the society. Constructivists look at how the two affect each 
other, and how they help to construct one another.  
5.2.1 Constructivism in international relations 
It is important to clarify that constructivism in this thesis is used in the sense that 
relates to international relations theory. Constructivism as a theory within the IR 
framework does use and relate to other more broad philosophies such as social 
constructivism, however, it is important to emphasise that constructivism within this 
thesis is used to explain the way states act with each other. As suggested above, 
constructivists argue that objects or subjects are not just independent entities, but 
that they are entities, which can be moulded and shaped as a result of the 
environment they are placed in. The way constructivism relates to IR is that ‘social 
phenomena such as states or alliances or international institutions, that is the 
collective subject of international relations, may build on the basic material of human 
nature, but then take specific historical, cultural, and political forms that are a 
product of human interaction in a social world’ (Fierke (2010), p. 179). In other 
words, there may be a natural substance such as iron; however, the iron can be 
moulded and shaped into a number of different things such as knives, forks, spoons 
etc. This is the basic constructivist claim in international relations theory. As Fierke 
also argues, the actors (states) are not ‘totally free to choose their circumstances, but 
rather that they can make choices in the process of interacting with others and, as a 
result, bring historically, culturally, and politically distinct ‘realities’ into being’ (Fierke 
(2010), p. 180). This statement is in contrast to the realist claim that the structures 
are dominant. Michael N. Barnett’s definition of constructivism in relation to 
international relations can also prove helpful, as he argues that a constructivist 
approach to international relations theory ‘posits that the actions of states, like 
individuals, take on meaning and shape within a normative context, that their 
interactions construct and transform their normative arrangement, that the norms 
can in turn shape their identity and interest, and that the problem is usually “solved” 
through social negotiations and a mixture of coercion and consent’ (Barnett (1998), 
p. 5)  
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According to Dale C. Copeland’s work, constructivism differentiates itself from other 
forms of IR theories in three ways especially: It is guided by intersubjectivity, which 
has been described above. Second, the ideational structure has a constitutive and 
not just regulatory effect on actors. Third, the ideational structures and actors con-
constitute and co-determine each other (Copeland (2006), p. 2). These three points 
are in line with previous statements in this chapter, thereby further implying the 
constructivist argument i.e. that an actor’s reality at any point in time is historically 
constructed and contingent – reality is made by man so to speak.  
 
The question of why constructivism can be interesting for the case of Turkey may be 
found in Barnett’s (1998) work on ‘Dialogues in Arab politics’. According to Barnett’s 
research, Arabian countries in the Middle East have been competing to be leading in 
defining Arabian identity, or what he calls Arabism. He furthermore claims that this 
competition has an influence on the way that countries in the Arab world have 
moulded and formed their foreign policy historically. The historic fight over Arabism 
entailed being seen as ‘representatives of the Arab nation and not only of the 
territorial state’ (Barnett (1998), p. 8). Although not included in Barnett’s research it 
can prove helpful to analyse Turkey’s foreign policy from this angle. Turkey has by 
some been proclaimed as a new leader of the Muslim world. This will be included in 
the constructivist analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy. 
5.3 Constructivism and Realism 
Constructivism and realism are often seen as complete opposites to each other, 
however, this can be argued to be a truth with modifications. Wendt did not see the 
two as mutually exclusive, which can be seen from the following sentence: ‘at some 
level material forces are constituted independent of society, and affect society in a 
causal way. Material forces are not constituted solely by social meanings, and social 
meanings are not immune to material effects’ (Wendt (1999), p. 111-2). This does 
not mean that Wendt valued the two equally; the function of ideas was still at the 
heart of Wendt’s theoretical framework. However, the sentence demonstrates how 
the two are functioning in relations with each other. This is seen as a positive 
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statement for this thesis, as it agrees that the two are not exclusive but rather are 
parts of a synthesis, as stated in the motivation. 
 
When researching security issues, the difference between realism and 
constructivism really shows. For realists, the primary aspect of security is the 
materialistic aspect. For them, the physical things such as territory, populations, 
weapons etc. constitute the single most important thing when analysing which entity 
is more powerful in a given structure. For constructivists, this is not the determining 
factor when it comes to power. Within the constructivist framework, human 
thoughts behind the physical assets are much more crucial, such as the guidance, 
organisation etc. Constructivists do not dismiss the important impact of the physical 
assets to world politics; however, they do not see them as the determining factor, 
and argue that human ideas and influence are the determining factor, when a state 
is making a given decision. Put differently, Wendt’s constructivism acknowledges 
material/realist factors but argue that how they function is based on ideas. There is 
still a struggle between constructivists regarding the importance of structure vs. 
individual human action. For John Elster, the primary part of the relationship 
between the two is individual human action, as he argues that: ‘they arise as the 
result of the action and interaction of individuals’. Other scholars such as Max Weber 
emphasises ‘the vitality of structure for explaining the origins of human action’, while 
Anthony Giddens’ emphasise a balance between structure and individual human 
action (Gülseven (2010), p. 27). Although these scholars are social constructivists, 
rather than IR constructivist, they still bring up important points relevant to this 
project, which is why they are included. The discussion between different 
constructivists is far from coincidental, as the grey area of how much the two affect 
each other is hard to outline. However, what is most important to note here is that 
those constructivists all dismiss the realist assumption that structures are the 
paramount force and that all other factors such as religion, identity etc. are of less 
importance, or should not even be considered.  
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5.4 Evaluation of findings 
There are many ways in which it is possible to define both realism and 
constructivism. The objective for this chapter has been to capture broad aspects of 
these definitions, while still being specific. Realism has been defined as a theory in 
international relation that focuses greatly on the anarchical structures of the IR 
system, while being overall concerned with obtaining power. A large part of the 
realist research this thesis has used for the chapter has argued that realism alone 
can analyse historical events and also explain the motivation behind the action of 
nation states’. This thesis does not share this point of view, as it gives too narrow a 
spectre for analysis. As mentioned earlier, realism does not take into account 
important factors such as identity, religion or other important factors that 
contributes to a full analysis. Therefore, constructivism has been included to 
broaden the scope, mainly because it seems highly relevant for a Muslim country 
such as Turkey, but also because the research of realism reveals flaws and defects. 
Constructivism can be helpful in addressing these flaws and defects, especially 
through the clarification of how Muslim identity vs. Western identity is playing a 
role, when the objective is to explain a shift in Turkish foreign policy.  
 
Another objective for this chapter has been to mix both realism and constructivism 
with each other. After reviewing the research, there does seem to be foundation for 
a synthesis, as the two groups of scholars do seem to recognize the importance of 
each other. This is especially proven by the quotes from Waltz and Wendt that 
reveal some form of mutually recognition. This alleged recognition should not be 
interpreted as a claim of agreement between the two; however, it does open the 
door for a two sided analysis of the change in the Turkish foreign policy. 
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6. Three Stage Analysis of Turkey’s Foreign Policy 
In the previous chapters of this thesis, background information on Turkish history 
and the international relation theory framework of realism and constructivism has 
been the main focus. Due to the limited scope of the thesis, not all relevant material 
have been included; however, I have attempted to pinpoint events in Turkish history 
that I argue are relevant before making my analysis. The following chapter has the 
objective of finding answers to my initial question, and thereby also attempts to 
explain and untangle the complex change in Turkish foreign policy, which I argue has 
taken place over the past two decades. A change, which has primarily taken place 
since the end of the Cold War and especially since the AKP party took over 
government in 2002. I especially argue that the decisions made by the Turkish 
government during the AKP rule can best be explained by applying constructivist 
theory. This is a major change, because I argue that Turkey historically has made use 
of foreign policy tools, which could primarily be explained through realism as a result 
of the Cold War and the relationship with the U.S. and the West.  
 
There are multiple areas of inquiry, by which one can analyse the foreign policy 
situation in Turkey. One might be to look at the ongoing accession of Turkey into the 
European Union. Another alternative could be to look at external influences on the 
Turkish state. However, the form of analysis I have chosen is to look at different 
developments at the systemic, regional and domestic levels of Turkish politics (Oktav 
(2011)). It is my argument that the three levels are all interconnected, which 
requires that an analysis of all three levels is made to deliver the full scope of this 
complex matter. In order to activate my theoretical framework of both realism and 
constructivism, I have chosen to divide the analysis of the domestic level into a 
realist assessment and a constructivist assessment. This will accentuate how the two 
frameworks complement each other, while still being in opposition. The regional 
analysis is also divided into two parts. Firstly, the period 1990-2002 is analysed with 
primary focus on realism, after which 2002-2011 is analysed by primary use of 
constructivism. The argument for doing so is to be specific in the application of the 
theory, and to emphasise the specific points that can be best explained through 
realism and constructivism respectively. Finally, the systemic analysis is included. 
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Finally, the assessment of the systemic environment will be divided into a realist and 
a constructivist assessment. This is again to activate the theoretical framework 
chosen for this thesis.  
6.1 Changes in the Domestic Environment 
What has been emphasised in previous chapters is that Turkish domestic politics 
have been characterised by a consistent battle over the leadership of the country. 
This could of course be said for a large sample of nations, but what makes the case 
of Turkey special is that religion and Turkey’s Muslim identity has been the major 
struggle point. To make matters even more complicated, the Turkish military has 
played a rather large and violent role in regulating the different governments and 
has been interfering by staging military coups, also referred to as the ‘deep state 
issue’. As explained in the definition of terms, the deep state issue is similar to that 
of a state within a state, and describes how an entity within the state, such as the 
military, ’has its own agenda other than the coming and going elected governments, 
and tries to achieve its goals by forcing the limit of legality and violate it, if necessary’ 
(Hurriyet Daily News (29 December 2012)).  Throughout recent time, this battle in 
domestic politics has been rooted in religious influence on politics (secularism vs. 
Islamism), but also, as a direct consequence of this issue, over how political leaders 
positioned Turkey in the international spectrum (East vs. West). There has been a 
long tug-of-war regarding Turkey’s cultural heritage dating back to when Atatürk 
created the Turkish/Western identity in the 1920s.  
 
However, after the turn of the millennium, there has been one event that stood out 
more than any other. When the AKP government took over in 2002, it sent a 
message to Turks as well as leaderships around the world that change was coming to 
Turkey. Not only was the party led by controversial political figures, but the AKP had 
its roots in the old Virtue/Welfare Party, which was shut down by the Turkish 
constitutional court in the 1990s to protect the secular nature of the Turkish state. 
Furthermore, the current leader of the AKP and Prime Minister of Turkey Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan was arrested and imprisoned in 1998 after reciting a poem while 
being Mayor of Istanbul. The poem was found to incite religious and racial hatred, 
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and he was therefore convicted to serve ten months in prison (Shambayati (2004); 
(Trend (18 April 2012)). 
 
Using Turkey’s foreign policy, the following chapter will offer a realist assessment of 
the change in Turkish domestic policy, but because realism does not offer a 
complete analysis of the situation in Turkey, a constructivist analysis of the changes 
will be added to broaden the analytical scope. Especially Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu’s five new concepts of foreign policy, which were presented in his 
‘Strategic depth doctrine’, are of interest. The five concepts are: ‘balance between 
security and freedom, zero-problems with the neighbours, developing relations with 
the neighbouring regions and beyond, rhythmic (pro-active) diplomacy, multi-
dimensional foreign policy’ (Oktav (2011), p. 21). 
6.1.1 Realist Assessment of Turkey’s Domestic Environment 
Since the AKP government took over in 2002, I argue that changes have occurred in 
Turkish foreign policy. Turkey is still looking to maximise its relative power in the 
region, while the nation is still attempting to uphold a strong relationship with the 
U.S., the EU and NATO. Prime Minister Erdogan has on several occasions declared 
Turkey’s loyalty to NATO (Xinhua News Agency (27 August 2009), or when Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in October 2011 characterised the AKP’s politics as: 
‘’proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy’ that honoured NATO alliances but also 
maintained Turkey’s organic cultural and religious ties with the Muslim world’ 
(Crescent-International (October 2011). According to Tür and Han, the AKP has also 
been Europeanising Turkey’s foreign policy ‘especially in terms of the style or the 
utilization of the tools of foreign policy (Oktav 2011), p. 20). This indicates that 
Turkey and the AKP have been working at establishing closer ties to the EU. 
Davutoğlu furthermore argues that the increased effort in Asia is beneficial to 
Turkey’s chances of joining the EU (Öniz & Yilmaz (2009), p. 9). Turkey was upgraded 
to candidate country status in 2005, a status which is still greatly discussed among 
the 27 members of the European Union. 
 
It can however be a challenge to explain contemporary Turkish foreign policy by 
strictly using realism as my theoretical framework.  Several things indicate that 
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Turkey’s foreign policy can no longer be explained by using only realism. This stands 
in complete contrast to, what I argue, has been realist tendencies that have 
dominated Turkish foreign policy since Atatürk reformed the republic in the 1920’s. 
An example of this is when former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister 
Abdullah Gül in August 2005 declared ‘that a fixed realism alone cannot be enough in 
international policy: ‘we should take into account ideas, norms and values as 
important factors of international policy. A realistic point of view supported by an 
idealistic vision is not impossible. On the contrary, it can be very fruitful’ (BBC 
Monitoring International Reports (26 August 2005)). Faruk Yalvac argues that 
Davutoğlu’s strategic depth ‘is based on traditional realist geopolitical ideas of 
frontiers, territory, strategic belts, basins and conflict belts’ (Yalvac (2012), p. 168), 
meaning that Davutoğlu rejects the traditional image of Turkey as a bridge between 
East and West. 
 
An overall point of realism theory is that all states should strive to become 
hegemons and with his five concepts of strategic depth, realist theory would argue 
that Davutoğlu is seeking to claim that status for Turkey. It seems farfetched to 
argue that Turkey is on its way to become a global hegemon. As argued by 
Mearsheimer, there is only one global hegemon in the current global system and 
that is the U.S., but it is fair to claim that Turkey is fighting for regional hegemony. 
The potential status of Turkey as a regional hegemon is also argued by Yalvac: ‘(…) 
Turkey has the potential to take on the role of regional hegemon in the Middle East’ 
(Yalvac (2012), p. 174). It is my argument that Erdogan sees Turkey as the leader of 
the Muslim world. This can be seen by this quote from September 2012 when he 
said: ‘We called ourselves conservative democrats. We focussed our change on basic 
rights and freedom (…) this stance has gone beyond our country’s border and has 
become an example for all Muslim countries’ (Arab News (30 September 2012)). 
Along the same line, Walker argues that Erdogan is promoting Turkey as the natural 
leader of the Muslim world (Linden et al (2012), p. 15). Davutoğlu also makes the 
realist argument regarding Turkey that: ‘it has no chance to be periphery, it is not a 
sideline country of the EU, NATO or ASIA’, which indicates Turkey’s aspiration for 
regional hegemony (Linden et al (2012), p. 26). It is my argument that Davutoğlu is 
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using his strategic depth doctrine to embrace Turkish historical ties to the region 
rather that running away from them. By running away from them, Turkey is also 
running away from both political and economic opportunity. In other words, it can 
be argued that Davutoğlu’s doctrine is a form of Turkish neo-nationalism designed to 
maximise Turkey’s relationship with the region. Walker also claims that his Strategic 
Depth Doctrine seeks to counterbalance Turkey’s dependencies on the West by 
courting multiple alliances to maintain the balance of power in the region (Linden et 
al (2012), p. 27). Multiple alliances and less dependency on other actors are also 
indications of regional hegemony.  
 
As an addition to this aspiration of regional hegemonic status, Yalvac argues that: 
‘(…) Turkey appears to be seeking greater independence and multilateralness in its 
foreign policy in a way that differs radically from it policy during the Cold War period’ 
(Yalvac (2012), p. 174). This argument is highly interesting for this thesis. Although 
classic realist thoughts of a bipolar system, which brought Turkey closer to the West, 
seems somewhat deteriorating in international relations, realism still has its 
eligibility in explaining the foreign policy of Turkey. While realism during the Cold 
War was very focussed on hard power i.e. attack your enemy before it attacks you, 
the policy tools that Davutoğlu and Turkey have made use of in attempting to reach 
hegemonic status are different. The new policy tools of Turkish foreign policy are to 
a much higher extent the use of soft power. This argument is supported well by Tocci 
& Walker: ‘In the 1990’s Turkey’s military ties with Israel, its coercive pressure on 
Syria, and its participation in Western sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq were 
largely framed within a realist understanding of the Middle Eastern balance of 
power. Today, Turkey presents itself as a mediating power in the region (…) (Linden 
et. al. (2012), p. 23) and (Önis & Yilmaz (2009), p. 9)). As such, it does seem as 
though the overall ambition of Turkish foreign policy is the same as it has been from 
a realist point of view. However, there are indications of change regarding the way 
this maximisation of power is obtained. This is perhaps the reason why Yalvac is 
claiming that Davutoğlu is torn between realism and constructivism (Yalvac (2012), 
p. 168). 
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So the goal of Turkish foreign policy remains unchanged. It is still driven by a realist 
ideal of maximising relative power of the state, which leaves the question; what has 
changed? Gül’s statement in the beginning of this chapter revealed that realism 
alone was not sufficient in explaining the way the Turkish government exerted 
foreign policy. Coupled with Yalvac’s statement regarding Davutoğlu being torn 
between realism and constructivism, I argue that it is relevant to make a 
constructivist analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy. 
6.1.2 Constructivist Assessment of Turkey’s Domestic Environment 
Over the past decade AKP has been preoccupied with a number of different political 
agendas. One of these has been to ‘force Islamist issues onto the political agenda, 
such as the turban (headscarf) and changing the entrance requirements to 
universities for the graduates of religious secondary schools (Imam hatip okkullari), 
further alienated secular groups in the country’ (Yesilada & Rubin) (2011), p. 1). The 
headscarf issue concerns the regulation imposed by the Turkish government in the 
1980s, which banned women who wore headscarves from working in the public 
sector. The ban applied to teachers, lawyers, parliamentarians, women who 
attended university etc. The headscarf issue is a good example of how the AKP 
government has attempted to change the Turkish attitude towards non-secular 
rhetoric in the public debate.  In an interview regarding the headscarf issue, Erdogan 
was quoted for saying: ‘Today, in a world where freedoms are debated, where 
everyone dresses up the way they want to everywhere they go, if Turkey still fails to 
resolve this issue, this is a serious problem in terms of freedoms’ (The New York 
Times (19 January 2008)). But even so, the question still remains whether or not this 
reveals AKP’s Islamic motives. This could just as well be interpreted as an argument 
for freedom of speech.  
 
Historically, it can be argued that Turkish state identity has had a major influence on 
Turkish foreign policy, while at the same time the foreign policy has had an equal 
amount of influence on the national identity of the Turkish state. The most obvious 
example is of course the reforms introduced in the Kemalist era, where Islam was 
almost completely removed from Turkish state identity. Constructivist scholar Yücel 
Bozdaglioglu describes the reforms as a ‘top down process carried out by 
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bureaucratic-authoritarian political and military elites, who were the products of the 
Ottoman reforms’ (Bozdaglioglu (2003), p. 7). Furthermore, Bozdaglioglu argues that 
it was a way of abolishing Turkey’s old values because while Ottoman reforms in the 
1700s and 1800s were also occupied with reforming the national identity of Turkey, 
they still remained loyal to their Islamic heritage. The abolishment of Islam is 
described by Robins in a similar way: ‘Atatürk sought to disengage Islam from the 
condition of being a political instrument. Second, he wanted to reduce Islam to the 
level of a civic religion, because of what he perceived as its tyranny over values and 
thought processes of the Turkish people’ (Robins (1991), p. 38). It is therefore a fair 
argument to state that Atatürk attempted to cleanse Islam out of Turkish politics, 
and to some extent state identity, as he saw it as a tyrannical and backward form of 
identity and cultural heritage.   
 
According to Bozdaglioglu, ‘identities of states are not static’ (Bozdaglioglu (2003), p. 
19). They might change as a result of domestic events such as revolutions, or they 
might change as a result of drastic political developments such as the situation in 
Iran in 1979, when the Islamic revolution took place. Change in identity might also 
occur through domestic institutional arrangement or elections or even as a result of 
a single individual with large influence on politics in a specific country. This argument 
is highly constructive and stands in complete opposition to the arguments presented 
by realists on the issue. As presented in the theory chapter, supporters of the realist 
analysis of international relations argue that state identity, and the way a state acts 
in the international community, is based on anarchistic and systemic developments. 
In other words, change of state identity cannot come from a single individual or as a 
result of a new government, as the influences from the international system will 
overrule these. This argument does carry some weight especially when put into the 
right context. During the Cold War era, little change was detected in Turkish foreign 
policy. It was presupposed that Turkey belonged to NATO and thereby the West, and 
this presupposition was not challenged except on a few occasions. Even when it was 
challenged as: ‘when former officials of the Welfare Party under the leadership of 
Nexmettin Erbakan seriously contested Turkey’s western identity and tried to reorient 
Turkey’s foreign policy away from Europe toward the Middle East’, no substantial 
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change was made. This was particularly due to the fact that the status of the 
international community did not allow it (Bozdaglioglu (2003), p. 11). Bozdaglioglu 
also brings up how identity can be affected from outside interference, which is what 
Barkin refers to as co-construction (Barkin (2010), p 27). Bozdaglioglu argues that 
identity is reinforced (or not) by contacts with others’. Furthermore, he argues that 
‘states construct their identities before they start interacting with others in the 
system’. This statement is also directly opposite the traditional realistic theory, that 
states’ identity is completely reliant on the anarchistic global system. 
 
Through Davutoğlu’s new concepts of foreign policy (Strategic Depth Doctrine), he 
argues that Turkey should have a visionary approach, and thereby anticipate and 
prevent crises before they emerge. This is far from the status-quo form of foreign 
policy that was practiced in Turkey during the Cold War and in the 1990’s. Tür & Han 
commented on traditional Turkish foreign policy as being ‘a particular foreign 
policy/security culture that was in essence “moderate and sober” as well as “realist, 
having its feet firmly based on realpolitik’ (Oktav (2011), p. 12). Larrabee also 
commented on Turkey’s traditional threat environment by saying: ‘during the Cold 
War, the main threats to Turkish security came almost exclusively from the Soviet 
Union’ (Larrabee (2007), p. 104). It is exactly this form of realist foreign policy that I 
argue Turkey is moving away from. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s five concepts reveal that 
Turkey feels much less obligated to follow orders from external influence. Instead, 
they are attempting to create a style of foreign policy that will benefit Turkey rather 
than the U.S. as well as its other allies. Öniz and Yilmaz describe Davutoğlu’s five 
concepts as a move away from a series of bilateral relations to a series of mutually 
reinforcing and interlocking processes (Öniz & Yilmaz (2009), p 9). Through soft 
power, i.e. power which is consent-based rather than command based, Turkey is 
attempting to protect itself from their new threat environment. This new threat 
environment will be analysed later in the analysis of the regional and systemic 
changes. 
 
I argue that Davutoğlu’s five concepts can best be explained through constructivism 
to a much greater extent than previously seen in Turkish politics. The following 
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statement regarding Zero-problems with neighbours exemplifies this well: ‘It is 
impossible for a country experiencing constant crises with neighbouring states to 
produce a regional and global foreign policy […] Relations with these countries have 
to be detached from the long and difficult process involving polities and bureaucrats. 
A broader basis, focused largely on intra society relations, including economic and 
cultural elements, must be found. […]. A comprehensive peace plan and a package to 
develop economic and cultural relations have to be put into place simultaneously to 
overcome security crises with the closest neighbours.’ (ESI (2009), p. 10) 
 
From this statement by Davutoğlu, it can be argued that Turkey’s new foreign policy 
plan is planned around developing both economic and cultural relations with 
Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood.  I use constructivism to explain this statement, 
especially when he argues that it is impossible for a state to produce regional and 
global foreign policy if the state is not at peace with its immediate neighbours. From 
a constructivist angle, this is highly interesting mainly because Davutoğlu emphasises 
Turkey’s cultural ties with its neighbours. From being a state with a Kemalist 
perspective on foreign policy or a state that almost exclusively looked to the West 
when producing foreign policy, this is a major turn of event. This is also why Tür and 
Han argue that Turkish foreign policy has changed: ‘In line with this point, from the 
late 1990’s onward, Turkish foreign/security culture has gone through a change; 
affected by an alternative culture of security, shaped by a worldview different from 
the Kemalist/Republicanist one’ (Oktav (2011), p. 9). But is the cause of this change 
of constructivist nature? I argue that this is mainly the case. However, there are 
diverging opinions on the matter.  
 
Taking a critical approach to the question, the work of Dietrich Jung is relevant to 
include. In his article ‘The domestic context of new activism in Turkish foreign policy’, 
he asks the question; to what extent Erdogan’s and Davutoglu’s personal religious 
attitudes materialize in foreign policy (Jung (2011/2012), p. 28). Jung argues that 
‘While the religious attitudes of the AKP leadership might matter with respect to the 
cultural framing of Turkey’s current foreign policy, there are—thus far—no structural 
and organizational mechanisms visible that translate these attitudes into foreign 
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policies’ and that ‘while the political decision-making of the leading AKP politicians 
might be affected by their religious worldview, their policies do not appear to be 
value-rational, i.e., independently guided by religious ideas, but rather follow the 
type of instrumental rationality that Weber identified as the main direction of action 
in the modern world’. Instead, he argues that the change in Turkey’s domestic 
political environment is caused by a softening of the powers used, which has 
gradually eroded the political power exerted by the Turkish military and the rising 
influence of society as a whole. Jung also argues that AKP’s use of religion as an 
independent variable does not differ from the use of religion by the Turkish 
government during other points in Turkish history. 
6.1.3 Evaluation of findings 
The objective of the first part of the analysis has been to explain and exemplify the 
shift in Turkish foreign policy that I argue has occurred. Although the realism and 
constructivists explanations have proven hard to separate and identify in the 
literature, I argue that there are grounds to make such a distinction. As the initial 
realist analysis show, there remains a wide consensus that realist policy 
considerations still remain the foundation of Turkey’s and AKP’s foreign policy. 
However, as can be seen by former Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül’s quote, a fixed 
realism alone cannot be enough in international policy. Therefore, a shift in Turkey’s 
foreign policy is fair to argue. 
 
Whether or not cultural/religious ideology is at the heart of this change has also 
been discussed. Relevant excerpts from articles, speeches and policy doctrines 
indicate that constructivism can explain much more of Turkish foreign policy than 
ever seen before in Turkish political history. Especially Davutoğlu’s five concepts of 
foreign policy confirm this argument. Not only does Davutoğlu attempt to affect 
Turkish foreign policy, he is also attempting to shift the direction of it. Now, more 
than ever, Turkey is courting its Muslim neighbours, which is hard to explain through 
realism, as it argues that the direction cannot be affected. These are all in line with 
the argument of increased constructivist influence that this thesis is attempting to 
prove. Finally, it must be included that the literature on the matter is somewhat 
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divided on the issue. As an example, Jung argues that the AKP is not using ideology 
and religion to affect Turkish foreign policy.  
6.2 Changes in the Regional Environment 
I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that my purpose is to analyze the 
different developments at the systemic, regional and domestic level by using the IR 
theory of realism and constructivism. The next step in this three-stage-analysis is to 
analyze and consider the changes at the regional level for Turkey. Until now, it has 
been argued that Turkey’s foreign policy, although still largely rooted in realism, can 
be explained through constructivist theory. This constructivist approach has 
especially had its eligibility within the past two decades after the Cold War. The 
following text will be devoted to the analysis of how the changes in Turkey’s regional 
setting have also had an impact on Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it will 
be analysed how this impact has been expressed and how constructivism and 
realism can explain this. Turkey’s changed relationship with its neighbours will be 
emphasized and yet again the analysis will be split into the theoretical directions of 
realism and constructivism. The two theoretical approaches will mainly attempt to 
identify main issues in the relationship between Turkey, Iran and Israel. It is my 
argument that these three are the main candidates for regional hegemony in the 
Middle East especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and furthermore these three 
have ‘begun to feature more prominently in regional politics since 9/11 (Oktav 
(2011), p. 19). Turkey’s relationship with Iran and Israel will be analyzed to show a 
shift in relations between the three. The analysis is split into two periods of time; 
1990-2002 to analyze the realistic aspect of the relationship, and 2002-2011 in order 
to analyze the relationship from a constructivist angle. The assessment of relations 
between the three will largely depend on statements by Turkey’s government 
officials, as these are rated to be a significant guidepost of assessing status of the 
relationships. 
 
Although not the focus of this thesis, it is relevant to acknowledge Turkey’s complex 
relationship with its near neighbour Syria. Syria has played a relatively large role in 
Turkish foreign policy. Especially Syrian support of the PKK as well as Syria’s alliance 
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with the Soviet Union has caused great unease for Turkey. It can be contributed to 
the Syria/Soviet alliance that Turkey was pushed towards greater security 
integration with the West. Since 2000 relations improved following Bashar Assad’s 
rise to power after his father’s death, and Turkey became the fourth largest trading 
partner of Syria. However since the recent revolt against Bashar Assad relations have 
deteriorated again. Syria and Turkey have both fired artillery across territories, and 
the conflict has not yet been resolved. As mentioned earlier, the scope of this thesis 
does not allow relations with Syria to be further elaborated, but it seems relevant to 
acknowledge that the Turkish-Syrian relationship has had implications for Turkey’s 
relations with it neighbours. 
6.2.1 Relations with Israel 1990-2002 
Several developments have contributed to the improving relationship that 
blossomed throughout the 1990’s and some of the 2000’s. The Madrid conference in 
November 1991 where Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians were 
negotiating peace, proved a positive and promising indication for a lasting peace in 
the region. However these peace talks had Turkey worried that Israel would back 
Syrian claims against Turkey in the Turkish-Syrian conflict over the waters of Tigris 
and Euphrates, and thus decided to pursue closer ties with Israel (Altunisik (2000)). 
Tocci and Walker argue that Turkey’s approach to Israel during the 1990’s was build 
‘on two pillars: a strategic military relationship with Israel and support for the Oslo 
process and its logic’ (Linden et al (2012), p. 39). Especially the numerous bilateral 
agreements between the two are an example of this. A tourism agreement in 1992, 
a framework agreement in 1993 comprising of tourism, economic cooperation, and 
educational exchanges, discussions on a free trade agreement in 1994 were only a 
few of the agreements that were signed during this decade. But the cooperation 
between the two countries was largely military-strategic. In 1996 the two countries 
signed a Military Training and Cooperation Agreement, which included joint training 
and intelligence-sharing activities, even allowing Israeli access to Konya airbase and 
Turkish airspace for training purposes (Linden et al (2012), p. 39); (Oktav (2011), p. 
35). Furthermore the agreement included military technology transfers, joint military 
research, regular strategic policy-planning dialogue etc. Hale argues that this 
agreement was a part of the U.S.–Israel defence pact signed in 1995, which had the 
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objective of creating a web of regional alliances in the Middle East (Hale (2000)). 
Bilateral trade boomed from $100 million in 1991 to $2 billion in 2000, which is also 
an indication of the blossoming relationship between the two countries during the 
1990’s. 
 
The improving relationship between the two countries caused great criticism from 
leaders in the Arab world. Tocci and Walker writes: ‘Turkeys military relationship 
with Israel raised eyebrows throughout the region and caused acute concern in Syria, 
Lebanon, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (Linden et al (2012), p. 42). 
Furthermore a Lebanese newspaper As-Safir called the Turkish-Israeli alliance ‘an 
alliance against all Arabs’. Moreover there was a sense among the Arab public that 
the alliance almost exclusively benefitted Israeli interests and was concluded at the 
expense of Arabs and Muslims (Jung (2005), p. 10). Syrian vice-president Abd al-
Halim Khaddam called it ‘the greatest threat to the Arabs since 1948’ (Bengio & 
Özcan (2001), p. 69). The 1996 military agreement was also termed ‘the 1996 
Bagdad Pact’ of course referring to The Bagdad Pact of 1955 in which Turkey joined 
an alliance with Western nations to form a bulwark of the northern tier states 
against the Soviet Union (Bengio & Özcan (2001), p. 68). Bengio and Özcan argues 
that the threat was perceived on many levels; Ideological, political and strategic. It 
was perceived as an ideological threat, because it was the first time in modern 
history that a Muslim country formed an alliance with the Jewish state.  
6.2.2 Relations with Iran 1990-2002 
Bilateral relations for Turkey with Iran have traditionally been strained over two 
issues: political Islam and the Kurdish question. These are first and foremost dealt 
with because of their importance for Turkey’s security dilemma. This has caused 
major tension between the two throughout history, and the 1990’s was no 
exception. In 1994 and 1999 Turkish fighter planes struck Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) camps in Iran and reportedly also hit Iranian border villages. The Turkish 
government accused the Iranian government of supporting the PKK. However in 
August 1999 a security agreement was signed between Turkey and Iran, which 
resolved the crisis. The security agreement permitted the launch of simultaneous 
attacks on terrorist camps on both sides of the Turkish-Iranian border (Hale (2000)).  
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The fear of the Iranian “exporting” the Islamic revolution and encouraging political 
Islam has also been of major concern to the traditionally Kemalist republic of Turkey. 
The Bageri incident is one example of this, when both countries recalled their 
ambassadors in 1997 because then Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Mohammed Reza 
Baqeri delivered a speech, urging Turks to follows Iran’s footsteps and conveyed the 
message that ‘those who sign agreements with the United States and Israel will, 
sooner or later, be penalized’ (Aras (2001), p. 108). Another example is when former 
Turkish President Süleyman Demirel accused parliamentarian Merve Kavakci of 
acting as an agent provocateur in the service of Iran. Iran was thus still considered 
Turkey’s feared other throughout the beginning of the 1990’s (Linden et al (2012), p. 
36). 
 
Especially the Baqeri incident left relations between the two tense. A Turkish 
newspaper article, which according to Aras reflected the official view of Turkey left 
no doubt, as to what Turkey had to say about political Islam: The people of Turkey, 
who believe in democracy and a contemporary way of life, will not allow individuals 
like you [Baqeri] to darken the bright future of humanity by creating a situation 
similar to that which existed in medieval times’ (Aras (2001, p. 108). The answer was 
of Kemalist nature and left no doubt that Turkey was still holding on to its secular 
foundation. On June 28, 1996, when proclaimed Islamist Necmettin Erbakan became 
Prime Minister, bilateral relations softened between the two. Erbakan first visited 
Iran in 1996 and signed and agreement to import $20 billion worth of natural gas. 
This meant ignoring the U.S. legislation prescribing penalties for companies trading 
above a low limit with Iran and Libya (d’Amato Law). Erbakan stated: ‘Turkey will not 
permit any third country to interfere in the growing trend of cooperation between 
Iran and Turkey’ (Bozdaglioglu (2003), p. 134). In addition Erbakan ordered the 
Turkish delegation to the UN to vote against the resolution that would condemn Iran 
for it human rights violations. Turkey voted against the resolution alongside states 
such as North Korea, China, Cuba and Libya. Necmettin Erbakan ended his PM period 
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in 1997.2 The energy agreement was finally put in effect on July 30, 2001 and 
became the beginning of improved political relations between the two. In May 2000 
the Turkish undersecretary of Foreign Trade Kursad Tuzmen visited Iran. His 
meetings with Iranian officials covered various issues including the establishment of 
a Turkish-Iranian Business Committee and the establishment of Turkish-Iranian 
Business Council to name a few (Aydin (2005), p. 32). 
6.2.3 Assessment of Relations with Neighbours 1990-2002 
When considering the above mentioned reactions from the Arab nations, it does 
seem obvious to explain the relationship between Turkey and its neighbours through 
realism in the 1990’s. This thesis argues that the relationship was closely tied to the 
bi-polar structure of the Cold War, and that Turkey was not willing or ready to 
abstain from the relationship with the West that they had been benefiting from 
throughout the Cold War as members of the Baghdad Pact. Syrian Foreign Minister 
Faru al-Shar probably expressed the frustration of many Arabs when he said that ‘an 
alliance between Israel and Turkey, the Muslim neighbouring country is both illogical 
and unacceptable’ (Bengio & Özcan (2001), p. 69). As mentioned previously, the 
relationship between Turkey and Israel was the first of its kind between a Jewish and 
a Muslim state and was therefore seen as especially disturbing, seeing as how Islam 
‘was the common denominator between Arabs and Turkey, and thus should have 
served as a major obstacle to such an alignment’ (Bengio & Özcan (2001), p. 69). 
 
These statements indicate that the major obstacle i.e. the common 
culture/identity/constructivist argument was largely ignored to make way for 
materialistic and military advantages such as the strategic-military agreements 
between Israel and Turkey in 1996. There was a fear among Arab nations that the 
new Turkey-Israeli alignment would tip the balance of power in the region and form 
a new axis with the help of the U.S, keeping the Arab nations to a marginal or 
subordinate role in the Middle East. Keeping with the realist theoretical point of 
view, the alignment between the two strong nations can be seen as a way of taking 
                                                     
2 Erbakan was removed by the National Security Council, when he was forced out 
without dissolving the parliament or suspending the constitution. The event was 
labelled a ‘postmodern coup’ 
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control of the region. Sergey Minisian even argues that ‘The Israeli-Turkish relations, 
as noted by both Turkish and Israeli researchers, is a strategic partnership, 
meanwhile this strategic partnership is designed not only to maintain the balance of 
power, since each party is in possession of the necessary military power to maintain 
its security at the regional level singlehanded. These are the relations of the two 
"status quo powers" desiring no profound geopolitical alterations within the region 
(Minisian (2003), p. 316). Özcan argues that the atmosphere of international politics 
was the main factor that influenced the relationship between Turkey and Israel in 
the post-Cold War era, thus arguing that ‘both countries were in search of allies in 
the region in adapting to the new condition’ (Oktav (2011), p. 31). Moreover Turkey 
was using Israel in strengthening Turkey’s hand in coping with its neighbours such as 
Iran and Syria, who were using the PKK as a trump card against Turkey in the 1990’s 
Oktav (2011), p. 32). 
 
The alliance between the two was based on strategic concerns and can therefore 
best be explained through realism theory. Turkey and Israel were forming an alliance 
based on strict materialistic without considering ideological, cultural or identity 
issues. Furthermore Turkey was emphasising its relationship with traditional bi-
polar-world allies, and thereby trying to optimize its strategic role in the region. This 
was exemplified by Israeli Defense Minister Mordechai, who said: ‘If countries like 
Iran, Iraq or Syria think that they can apply their capabilities against Turkey, 
however, they have to keep in mind that standing behind Turkey are the joint forces. 
Given the support of those forces, Turkey can be challenged by no single power in the 
region. I have discussed the strategic situation with Mr. U. Cohen, the US Secretary of 
Defense. We have also scrutinised those strategic issues with Mrs. Albright, the U.S. 
Secretary of State and the U.S. Chief of Staff. We are capable to work jointly against 
whatever threat in this region’ (Minisian (2003), p. 317). Former Turkish Prime 
Minister Tansu Çiller also talked warmly of Israel claiming that ‘both Turkey and 
Israel had been blessed with unique and courageous founding father – Ataturk and 
Ben-Gurion – whose best achivements continue as guideposts for our respective 
nations today (…)’ and furthermore referred to Israel as the ‘Promised Land’ 
(Bozdaglioglu (2003), p. 147). 
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The relationship between Turkey and Iran can also be explained through realism 
although to a lesser extent, seeing as how the two are tied closer to each other 
culturally than Turkey and Israel. What is interesting about Turkey’s relationship with 
Iran is that there historically has been some tension between the two in the region. 
This competitiveness stems from a disagreement over the allowance of political 
Islam in the political system. Thus it was unexpected when Turkey signed the major 
natural gas energy deal with the Iranian in 1996. Especially the impact the 
agreement had on Turkish-West relations makes it hard to explain the decision 
through realism, as the agreement impacted the relationship with Turkey’s largest 
ally the U.S. in a negative way. Not only did the Clinton administration express its 
displeasure and made it clear to Turkey that any defence cooperation with Iran 
would not be welcomed. Washington also claimed that as a NATO ally, Turkey’s 
efforts to improve military relations with a country that was developing weapons of 
mass destruction was unusual and asked Ankara to stop developing such relations 
with Tehran (Aydin (2005), p. 32). The decision to import Iranian natural gas despite 
the protests of Washington is argued by this thesis to be based in constructivism. 
Especially when considering the political arguments of Erbakan during the signing. 
The deal was to a large extent a signal to Washington that Turkey made its own 
decisions without being dictated by the U.S. From a realistic point of view this move 
can be hard to explain, as it did not correspond with Turkey’s obligations to NATO 
(Aydin & Aras (2005), p. 32).  
6.2.4 Relations with Israel 2002-2011 
Contrary to expectations, relations between Turkey and Israel continued to flourish 
immediately after AKP took over government in the 2002 general elections. AKP 
announced their intentions for developing closer ties with Muslim Countries, but the 
strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel continued. This was exemplified by 
Israeli president Moshe Katsav’s visit to Turkey in 2003, the continuation of joint 
military exercises as well as the signing of an agreement that would allow the sale of 
50 million cubic meters of water to Israel annually. Furthermore Turkish foreign 
minister Abdullah Gül also visited Israel in January 2005. 
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Even so Tocci and Walker argue that there has been a change in relations with Israel 
and the Palestinians in the twenty-first century (Linden et al (2012), p. 42). This 
change has especially been visible in the way Turkey officials have criticised the way 
Israel has acted in certain situations. Walker and Tocci writes: ‘In 2006 Prime 
Minister Erdogan described Israel’s war on Lebanon as “illegitimate”. Most 
notoriously, at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2009, days after the end 
of Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, Erdogan accused Israel (and his co-panelist 
Shimon Peres) of crimes against humanity (Linden et al (2012), p. 42). The bi-lateral 
relations between the two was further complicated after the “TV series crisis”3. 
Moreover, the “Flotilla incident” set a new standard in the way the two nations 
communicated. The incident has been described above however the reactions from 
both sides are of interest to this thesis. After the incident Turkey recalled its 
ambassador to Israel. President Abdullah Gül  said that ties between Turkey and 
Israel ‘will never be the same again’, while Deputy Prime Minister Bulen Arnic said 
that: ‘Ankara would reduce economic and defense ties with Israel to the minimum 
level’ (Xinhua New Agency – CEIS – 04 June 2010). Prime Minister Erdogan said that 
the clash was ‘a cause for war’ (Fox News – 12 December 2011) and repeatedly 
demanded an apology from the Israeli state like when he addressed the UN General 
Assbembly in 2011: ‘Israel must apologize and compensate for the deaths of our 
martyrs and lift the economic blockade on Gaza’ (Haaretz – 23 September 2011). The 
request for an apology from Israel even caused speculation as to whether or not 
Erdogan would use the attack to visit Gaza; however the speculations have not been 
confirmed (The National (21 July 2011)). Özcan describes the state of the Turkish-
Israeli relationship as a good indicator of how Turkish foreign policy has changed: 
‘Two picture, one taken in the mid 1990’s, during which Turkey enjoyed a firm 
military alliance with Israel, and another on in 2010, when Turkey had com of the 
edge of war with Israel to defend the rights of the Palestinians, represent 
                                                     
3 Renewed crisis caused by Turkey’s withdrawal of an invitation to Israel to 
participate in the military exercise Anatolian Eagle, along with Israel’s abhorrence at 
an episode of a Turkish TV serie showing Israeli forces deliberately targeting 
Palestinian children. 
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dramatically different realities which have created confusion in the minds of the 
observer’ (Oktav (2011), p. 31). 
6.2.5 Relations with Iran 2002-2011 
In contrast to Turkish-Israeli relations, Iran and Turkey’s relationship remained stable 
at the turn of the millennium. But not only did it remain stable; there are several 
indications that Iran went from being Turkey’s feared other to becoming a nation of 
interest for Turkey. Exports to Iran increased more that sevenfold from U.S.$ 300 
million to U.S.$ 2 billion between 2002 and 2009 (Oktav (2011), p. 82). Even more 
interesting for this thesis, similar to the case of Israel rhetoric of Turkish official 
change, but in the case of Iran, it changed to a more positive tone.  
Several of Erdogan’s statements regarding Iran proof a shift in relations, and more 
that indicate that Turkey has begun to view Iran as a friend rather than a foe. During 
an official visit to Tehran, Erdogan asserted that Iran and Turkey shared a common 
vision of the Middle East when he said: ‘there is no doubt he [Ahmadinejad] is our 
friend … we have had no difficulty at all’. Furthermore Erdogan has proclaimed the 
idea that Iran has a nuclear program as ‘just gossip’ (Oktav (2011), p. 82). Precisely 
Turkey’s attitude towards the Iranian nuclear program reveals a major shift in the 
relations between the two. Tocci and Walker argues that while Turkey object to a 
nuclear Iran, Turkey does not feel threatened by Iran’s nuclear program as its 
Western allies do (Linden et al (2012), p. 37). This is also the way Erdogan publicly 
lashed out at the UN Security Council in 2010, when the Security Council decided to 
impose new sanctions on Iran in connection with its nuclear program. Erdogan 
stated: ‘We have argued from the beginning that the issue must be solved through 
diplomacy’ (People’s Daily Online – 10 June 2010) and adding ‘Iran does not accept it 
is building a weapon. They are working on nuclear power for the purposes of energy 
only’ (Washington Times – 27 October 2009).  
 
The increased support from Turkey towards Iran has not gone unnoticed to Iranian 
officials. Iranian statements support the above mentioned indications that Iran-
Turkish relations have grown stronger. Especially Iranian support of Turkish handling 
of the Palestinian issues and Ayatollah Khamene’I statement is interesting: ‘your 
stance in supporting the Palestinian people was rational and a right move in line with 
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Islam. Adopting such stances will strengthen Turkey’s position in the Muslim world’ 
and ‘The Turkish government’s closeness to the Muslim world would consolidate its 
base among the public in Turkey and also pave the way for the Muslim world’s 
support for you’ (BBC – 29 October 2009). The before mentioned incident in Davos 
forum, when Erdogan walked of stage in front of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
and Shimon Peres caused praise from Iranian interim Friday prayers leader Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani (FARS news agency – 30 January 2009). The incident also 
received praise from Hizbullah’s head of foreign relations Ammar al-Moussawi 
calling Erdogan’s speech ‘Courageaous and committed to international causes, 
especially the Palestinian cause’ (The Daily Star – Lebanon (3 October 2009)). 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has on several occasions stated his satisfaction 
with PM Erdogan: ‘Your clear stance towards the Zionist regime had a positive effect 
in the world, especially the Islamic world, and I am sure that everyone was satisfied’ 
(AAJ News – 27 October 2009). During a meeting between Erdogan and 
Ahmadinejad it became evident that Iran and Turkey had found common ground 
towards their relationship with Israel: ‘The reality is that the Zionist regime is a 
threat to all nations, and if it finds the chance, it will annex all regional states. 
Ahmadinejad went on saying: It (Israel) does not want any other powerful state in 
the region’ (FARS News Agency – 27 October 2009). These statements from both 
Turkish and Iranian officials exemplifies well that there has been a shift to the 
positive between Iran and Turkey.   
6.2.6 Assessment of Relations with Neighbours 2002-2011 
Since the AKP government took over in 2002, there has been a shift in the way that 
Turkey interacts with its neighbours. The way Turkey interacted with its neighbours 
Iran and Israel was argued to be best explained through realism. Contrary to this, the 
way that the AKP government has handled themselves within the region has taken a 
more constructivist turn. This is not to say that realism does not still play a part in 
Turkey’s foreign policy, but it does seem reasonable to claim that Turkey’s 
interaction with neighbours can not be entirely explained through realism.  
Looking at the new situation in Turkey from a realism point of view Turkey is making 
decision that are not maximizing its relationship with the U.S. Instead Turkey is 
challenging its position in the axis (Israel/Turkey/U.S.) and pushing the boundaries of 
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the relationship. This challenging behaviour is especially seen in connection to the 
Turkish-Israeli relationship. Incidents such as the TV crisis, Flotilla and Davos cannot 
be explained through realism as it has had major implications with their ally, so how 
can it be explained? This thesis argues, that Erdogan and the AKP government are 
increasingly making foreign policy based on cultural and identity ties with its 
surrounding neighbours. The changed relationship with both Iran and Israel is in no 
way just a result of independent systemic forces that are forcing Turkey to move into 
this direction. It is my argument that Turkey is making intersubjective decisions 
based on the ideas of strong actors such as Erdogan, Davutoğlu and the rest of the 
AKP government. To make use of the “iron example” used in the theory chapter, the 
AKP government is making dependent and conscious decisions in regards to their 
foreign policy. They are moulding the iron into a form they feel fits Turkey’s interests 
best. Turkey’s challenging attitude towards Israel and the increasing support of the 
Palestinian state is a good example of this and the Muslim community has 
responded in a positive manner as this statement by Fawzi Barhoum, a Hamas 
spokesman, shows: ‘Hamas pays tribute to the courageous stand of Turkey's prime 
minister ... who in Davos directly defended the victims of the criminal Zionist war 
against our children and women in Gaza’ (Aljazeera.com – 31 January 2009). 
  
Had Turkey’s government had a foreign policy which could have been explained by 
strict realism, then it is the argument of this thesis that Turkish-Israeli relations had 
remained largely unchanged. This is mainly due to the military relationship between 
the two. Within the realism framework, Israel is posing a much larger military threat 
to Turkey than the Palestinians are. Moreover the relationship with the U.S. would 
be optimized if Turkey “sided” with Israel rather than Palestine. Even so Turkey has 
decided to stand up to its ally by not just challenging their historic relationship, but 
also by using rhetoric that could be argued as conflict seeking. The motivation for 
this behaviour should be found in constructivism. Erdogan and Turkey is looking to 
connect to its cultural i.e. Islamic heritage in a way that has not been seen since the 
Ottoman Empire. Walker argues that ‘Turkey is most shaped by its identity as the 
successor state to the collapsed Ottoman Empire’. 
58 
 
6.2.7 Evaluation of findings 
The findings above have attempted to show and prove that there has been a shift in 
the way that Turkey deals with its close neighbourhood. It has been made probable 
that this change has occurred, which is mostly seen through Turkey’s relationship 
with Israel. From being allies throughout the 1990s Turkey and Israel have had a 
declining friendship, which has been caused by several factors. From a realist point 
of view, this decline is contributed by the decreasing need for Israeli support in 
security matters. There has been a change in the threat environment for Turkey, 
which now to a much larger extent prioritize friendly relations with its Muslim 
neighbours such as Iran.  
 
To accentuate this shift in priorities, Turkey has dramatically shifted on the 
Palestinian issue.  Until the change Turkey was largely neutral or even supportive of 
Israel on matters in Gaza. However after AKP and Erdogan took over government in 
2002, Turkey has rhetorically and pragmatically been supportive of the Palestinians. 
As an example of this, the thesis has used the case of the Flotilla incident. Not only 
did Erdogan criticize the Israeli military action, literature indicates that war was at 
some point a possibility. Furthermore Erdogan’s behaviour at the 2009 World 
Economic Forum in Davos also proves this shift. Here Erdogan angrily walked of 
stage during a panel discussion on Gaza ‘vowing never to return to the annual 
gathering’ (The New York Times (29 January 2009). More importantly Erdogan 
expressed his discontent with President Peres of Israel stating that ‘when it comes to 
killing, you know well how to kill’ of course referring to the Israel-Palestine conflict. It 
is the argument of this thesis, that the shift in the relationship with Israel can be 
explained through a shift from realism to constructivism. The realistic regional 
environment of the post-cold-war-period of 1990-2002 did not allow Turkey to tone 
down relations with Israel, because Israel was essential to the axis consisting of 
Turkey, Israel and the U.S. 
 
Israel and the U.S. were Turkey’s guarantee for security, mainly because Turkey had 
solely relied on the alignment with the two, when forming thief foreign policy. 
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After the election of Erdogan and the AKP, Turkey has now taken on a form of soft 
power, neighbourhood friendly foreign policy, which is much more obvious to 
explain through constructivism rather than through realism. This is best exemplified 
through Turkey’s increasing relationship with Iran, which can hardly be explained 
through realism, as it draws immense strains on the relationship with both Israel and 
the U.S.. Therefore this is also an indication of how Turkey is moving in its own 
direction free of outside interference. 
6.3 Changes in the Systemic Environment 
The last step of the analysis will be to analyse the way the systemic environment has 
changed and how it has affected Turkey’s foreign policy decisions. Within the 
analysis, I will mainly focus on the U.S. because I argue that the U.S.-Turkey 
relationship is the most substantial and important one at the systemic level. Until 
now the changes at both domestic and regional levels have been covered, but as 
mentioned earlier, the analysis will be incomplete without the analysis of the 
systemic or global environment. Several points regarding the changes in the systemic 
environment have already been touch upon throughout the text till now. It has been 
mentioned repeatedly throughout this thesis that Turkey has relied heavily on 
security policies of its Western allies. This was largely due to how the global system 
was subdivided as a direct consequence of the Cold War era, where Turkey ‘has 
occupied a special place in American foreign policy’ and was considered a ‘southeast 
bastion of NATO and as a buffer state against the Soviet Union’ (Müftüler-Bac (2005-
2006), p. 61).  Oktav argues that it took Turkey several years before adapting to the 
new post-Cold-War system, and furthermore argues that Turkey did not begin to 
‘normalize its relations with its neighbouring regions after 1998’ (Oktav (2011), p. 
16). After the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., Turkey took part in the Bush campaign 
against terror, and with Turkey’s contribution of a Special Forces unit to the 
American-led coalition in Afghanistan there was a satisfaction that Turkey would 
remain an ally to the U.S., while still working at bettering its relations with it 
immediate neighbours in the Middle East. Turkey remained the only member of 
NATO with an overwhelmingly Muslim population and the secularism of Turkey was 
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still seen as an alternative to fanaticism and fundamentalism that were growing in 
other parts of the regions (Oktav (2011), p. 17).  
6.3.1 Turkey-U.S. relationship 
In order to understand the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, it is important 
to include some historical aspects of the relationship. As has already been accounted 
for, the Turkish leadership had become increasingly westernized in the years after 
the formation of the republic in 1920s. Larrabee writes: ‘One of the basic principles 
espoused by Mustafa Kemal (better known as Atatürk), the founder of the modern 
Turkish republic, was that Turkey should limit its involvement in Middle Eastern 
affairs, and except for a brief period in the 1950’s, Ankara largely stuck to it’ 
(Larrabee (2008), p. 103). This meant that Turkey had directed its focus from East to 
West. Especially Turkey’s membership to NATO has been an important issue for 
Turkish foreign policy, and it has been a defining factor for Turkey, when deciding 
the direction of their foreign policy. The main reason for joining NATO was the 
increased pressure from the USSR to yield control of the Straits (Robins (1991), p. 
25). Turkey needed to guard against a direct Soviet attack, and found that the best 
way to ensure protection was joining NATO and to create a mutual cooperation 
agreement with the other regional states in the northern tier to ensure that Moscow 
would not become a threat. This mutual cooperation agreement became known as 
the Baghdad Pact and was a clear sign of what side Turkey had chosen in the realist 
bi-polar system. The Baghdad Pact included Iraq, Iran, Pakistan to name a few, and 
was meant to close the gap in defence against the Soviet threat i.e. the Middle East 
(Robins (1991), p. 25). The pact triggered a number of events of which Turkey 
became more interventionist in the Middle East in the 1950’s as a way of confronting 
the communist threat (Robins (1991), p. 26). The Baghdad Pact was the ‘brief period’ 
Stephen Larrabee was referring to in his statement above. The decision to form an 
alliance in support of the West was not received well by less Western-oriented Arab 
regimes, which still saw Western states as colonial powers. This developed into a 
conflict that had Turkey and the West on one side, while Syria and the Soviet Union 
were on the other. An evidence of the support from Soviet to Syria was the $579 
million economic and technical agreement, which was concluded in 1957 (Robins 
(1991) p. 26). Turkey entered the Cold War and had officially sided with the West. 
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The following three decades, Turkey played a marginal role in the Middle Eastern 
region, mostly acting as a regional ally to NATO and the U.S., without acting upon 
own initiative. As Robins puts it: ‘For the next three decades Turkish policy towards 
the region was markedly more cautious, even to the point of meek-ness’ (Robins 
(1991), p. 26). 
In order to show the change in the way Turkey has dealt with its ally the U.S., I use 
two important moments in the Turkey-U.S. relationship where the U.S. required 
assistance from the Turkish state. These two moments are the Gulf crisis in 1990-
1991 and the Iraq War in 2002-2003. What is especially interesting about these two 
specific events is that the response from Turkey was very different in the Gulf Crisis 
in 1990-1991 than it was in the Iraq War of 2002-2003. My objective is to explain the 
change by using both realism and constructivism. 
6.3.2 Turkey’s involvement in the Gulf Crisis 1990-91 
Following the statement of Phillip Robins, it seems reasonable to skip ahead in time 
to the 1990’s. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 offered a new 
challenge to Turkish foreign policy, and stressed the increased relationship between 
Turkey and the U.S., which had been developing during the bi-polar era of the Cold 
War. A lot was a stake for Turkey during the Gulf War, and it was of great 
importance for future relations with the West and the Middle East how the Turkish 
government chose to react. Turkey was of central importance to Iraq especially via 
the two Iraqi oil pipelines which went through Turkish territory (Robins (1991), p. 
68). Furthermore Turkey was yet again pinned between interests. Direct Turkish 
involvement in the crisis would undoubtedly create suspicions of neo-Ottomanism, 
but at the same time Turkey had obligations towards its Western allies and 
especially the U.S., who had already gotten involved in the conflict.  
After initially being reluctant to get involved, the Turkish president at the time, 
Turgut Özal, decided to take the following initiatives in support of the U.S.: First, 
Turkey closed down the Kerkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, ‘and thereby largely 
contributed to the success of the economic sanctions’ (Müftüler-Bac (2006), p. 63). 
Secondly, trade with Iraq was closed down, which stopped nearly 80 percent of all 
Iraq’s trade. Third, averted troops to Iraq’s northern border and fourth, allowed 
access to Turkish bases and Turkish airspace for the U.S.-led coalition (Müfltüler-Bac 
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(2006), p. 65). The support by Turkey has been described as crucial by Robins (Robins 
(2007), p. 18). The decision to do so, was considered to be a conscious choice of 
supporting the Americans and was to a large extent done on the Presidents own 
initiative. Robins even speculates that the decision was made by Özal because he 
wanted to emphasize his dominance over national policy-making and his personal 
commitment to the Western camp (Robins (1991), p. 70). Furthermore Robins 
states: ‘Özal seems to have regarded the crisis as a chance to prove Turkey’s strategic 
regional importance to the USA (…) and that Turkish government official ‘(…) that 
their (Turkey’s) chances of being admitted to the EC would be strengthened as a 
result of the crisis (Robins (1991), p. 71). Tocci describes the decision to support the 
U.S. as follows: ‘the Gulf War pushed Turkey into the Middle East and above all 
provided Ankara with an opportunity to reconfirm its Western credentials’ (Linde et 
al (2012), p. 196). The reaction by President Özal and Turkey exemplifies well the 
relationship that Turkey and the U.S. had immediately after the conclusion of the 
Cold War. Turgut Özal was the first Turkish president who had been born in the 
Republic of Turkey, the first president to be an overtly devout Muslim, and a 
president who ‘represented a shift from Turkey’s rejectionist memories to a more 
glorified vision of its Ottoman past’ (Linden et al (2012), p. 24). Although being a 
devout Muslim leaning more towards the East rather than the West, glorifying 
Turkey’s Ottoman past and arguing that Turkey should again become a regional 
player, he still relied on the support of the West and the especially the U.S. This is 
argued by Linden & Tolay: ‘Özal initiatives on reaching out to the Central Asian 
republics were possible as long as Western support was evident’ (Linden et al (2012), 
p. 25). The support did not go unnoticed in the U.S. As Tocci writes: ‘Turkey’s 
activism often fuelled the volatile and conflict-prone nature of the region requiring 
frequent U.S. intervention in order to avert crisis’ (Linden et al (2012), p. 196). But as 
the next paragraph will show, this reliance on Turkish support had changed, when 
the invasion of Iraq started. 
6.3.3 The Turkish decline to participate in the invasion of Iraq 2002-03 
When the U.S.-led coalition in 2002 prepared for the war against Iraq and the regime 
of Saddam Hussein, the U.S.-officials were convinced that they could rely on their 
Middle Eastern ally Turkey to deliver support from the north. This was of great 
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importance to the coalition, mainly because it would allow the coalition to strike 
from both the north and the south. However the support from Turkey would not be 
as easy to obtain as expected. The meetings between the US and Turkey leading up 
to the invasion in 2003 assured the Americans that they could count on Turkey to 
support them. This was not only the case in a meeting between Erdogan and George 
Bush on 10 December 2002, but also during a visit by the Deputy Defense Secretary 
Paul Wolfowitz in Ankara in both July and again in December (Müftüler-Bac (2006), 
p. 67). ‘During the former (July ed.), the Turks were informed that, in the event of 
war, U.S. plans would involve launching attacks from Turkish soul; in the latter 
(December ed.), their formal approval for such an operation was sought’ (Robins 
(2007), p. 20). According to Robins, Erdogan made ‘Protestations of friendship that in 
American eyes appeared to confirm existing views of Turkey as a reliable strategic 
partner and cooperative regional ally’ (Robins (2007), p. 20). Furthermore the U.S. 
relied on their historical relationship, especially the support during the Gulf War 
mentioned above. The American request was to ‘allow some 80,000 U.S. troops to 
transit Turkey and permit U.S. engineers to make site inspections of six Turkish air 
bases and three harbours (…)’. In return the Turks were offered an economic 
package worth $14-$26 billion. (Olson (2005), p. 142) 
 
The two sides even came to an agreement in February of 2003, where it was decided 
to upgrade seven of the joint military bases and two ports in Turkey, so that they 
would be ready to deploy American troops to Iraq, and Turkey’s National Security 
Council agreed that Turkey should be involved in the Iraq campaign. However a 
parliamentary approval for military measures with regard to Iraq was required 
according to the Turkish constitution (Robins (2007), p. 20). The result of the 
parliamentary vote became a blow to the Turkish-U.S. relationship. The vote failed 
to achieve an absolute majority of those present, as required and therefore fell. On 
20 March, ‘a more limited motion to permit over-flights for U.S. aircraft, as well as 
endorsing the deployment of Turkish forces beyond national borders’ was approved 
(Robins (2007), p. 21). Sara Akram writes that the invasion of Iraq and the refusal to 
fulfil the U.S. demands ‘changed much for Turkish-U.S. relations’ (Akram (2010), p. 
4).    
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Because the three-stage-analysis is very much interconnected a lot of the relevant 
points regarding the changes at the systemic level, have already been touched upon 
in the previous parts of the analysis. However the two examples above, concerning 
Turkey’s handling of relations with the U.S. during the Gulf War and the invasion of 
Iraq in 2002-03 exemplify well how Turkey has become more independent in 
forming their foreign policy. As mentioned before, Turkey still largely depended on 
its alliance with the U.S. in the period immediately after the Cold War. I argue that 
Turkey was still “stuck” in the realist bi-polar global environment, and still required 
U.S. support. Therefore it was only natural that Turkey gave its undivided support, 
when the U.S requested it in 1990-91. However it remains interesting to analyse why 
Turkey hesitated to support its ally in the war against Iraq in 2003. 
6.3.4 Realist assessment  
From a realism point of view, support of the U.S. in Iraq in 2003 would, to some 
extent, have been a sensible solution. While it would have upheld diplomatic ties 
between the two long time allies, it would have been profitable in an economic 
sense as well. The two nations were negotiating a $14 billion economic, trade and 
credit package and by supporting the Americans, Turkey would have made use of 
U.S. pressure in its candidacy for the European Union. Still Turkey hesitated and 
declined the initial proposition on 1 March 2003.  
 
To understand this through realism, this defiance can be explained with Turkey’s 
aspiration of becoming a regional hegemon and Turkey’s desire to make unilateral 
decisions. Former PM Abdullah Gül stated on 30 December 2002 that: ‘regardless of 
U.S. plans and objectives, Turkey, too, “had its own scenario” concerning the 
disposition of Iraq (…)’ (Olsen (2005), p. 142). Saban Kardas describes Turkey’s 
strategy as a way ‘to guarantee Turkey’s right and ability to act unilaterally and, 
when necessary, independently of the warring coalition to protect its interests in Iraq’ 
(Yavus (2006), p. 312). The aspiration to become independent of the U.S. and the 
desire to become a regional hegemon is classical realism theory. However it does not 
explain why Turkey would defy its strongest ally at the systemic level. According to 
realism theory, this defiance would not have been a possible option because of the 
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anarchistic system of which individual nation had little or no influence. I therefore 
turn to constructivism to make an additional assessment that can add to the 
discussion. 
6.3.5 Constructivist assessment 
In Olson (2005), Sedat Ergin, one of Turkey’s top diplomatic journalists, lists eleven 
mistakes that U.S. official made in persuading Turkey to participate in the 2003 Iraq 
war. Not all are relevant in this context, however some are. According to Ergin, the 
U.S. ignored the fact that the AKP constituency was one-third Islamist oriented, it 
could therefore not easily attack another Muslim country. Olson states that the AKP 
was ‘decidedly more ambivalent regarding the war than the three part coalition 
government that it replaced’. Kardas argues that the reluctance to support the U.S. 
was caused be a division within the AKP. Many of the party’s members were thus 
against the involvement in the war and therefore voted against the proposition. The 
reluctance was, according to Kardas, rooted in identity issues (Yavuz (2006), p. 326). 
These statements all indicate that Islam had an influence on the reluctance to 
support the Americans in Iraq.  
 
With these statements by Karda and Ergin I argue, that the hesitation to support the 
Americans in 2003 can be explained by applying the constructivist theoretical 
framework. The quotes from Karda and Ergin confirm that the aspects of 
international relations are not as one sided, as presented by realist. Just as Jackson 
and Sørensen presented in the theory chapter, the social aspect has come into play. 
The hesitation was constituted by ideas, not by material forces. The decision was not 
the optimal seen from a materialistic point of view; however, the Turk’s affected the 
decision on the ground of an ideological standpoint. This can be explained through 
the constructivist notion of intersubjectivity, which dictates that common ideas and 
understandings are what matters in international relations (Barkin (2010). Similarly, 
this is what Fierke argued, when she stated that alliances build on the basic material 
of human nature, but they take specific historical, cultural, and political forms. The 
reservations of Turkey, regarding attacking another Muslim country, are exactly the 
extra layer of international relations that constructivists argue exists. And it is exactly 
this extra layer, which realists dismiss.  
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6.3.6 Evaluation of findings 
The findings in the analysis of the systemic environment first and foremost indicate 
that Turkey’s relationship with its global ally has changed. Because the Soviet threat 
no longer exists and the realistic bi-polar environment has disappeared, the need for 
U.S. support is no longer there to the same extent as it was during the Cold War. It is 
therefore my argument that Turkey is now in a position were they can make 
unilateral decisions without the acceptance from the U.S., and furthermore, Turkey 
is making use of this position. 
 
The growing focus on relations with Muslim neighbour states, at the expense of 
Turkish-U.S. relations, can be explained through the constructivist concept of 
intersubjectivity. Through this intersubjectivity the cultural, ideational and religious 
bond, which Turkey shares with its Muslim neighbours, trumps the traditional realist 
security bond, which Turkey shares with the U.S. During the Cold War, the situation 
was the exact opposite because of the Soviet threat. 
 
Thus it is my argument that the decreasing Soviet threat makes it possible for the 
AKP to embrace Turkey’s Ottoman past once again and this is best explained through 
constructivism.   
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7. Conclusion 
Throughout my thesis, I have attempted to show how the foreign policy of Turkey 
has change, and to what extent this can be explained through constructivism and 
realism. In order for me to answer my initial problem statement I have made use of a 
three-stage-analysis to prove that a change/shift has occurred. My initial problem 
statement was:  
‘How can the post-Cold-War change in Turkish foreign policy be explained?’ 
 
The question in itself already presupposes and claims that a change in Turkish 
foreign policy has taken place after the end of the Cold War. It has therefore been 
the initial objective of this thesis to prove and argue that change has occurred before 
moving on to the explanation of how the change can be explained through 
constructivism and realism. By using the domestic political situation as a guiding 
pole, I have established that Davutoğlu, Erdogan and the AKP have all strayed away 
from what is considered traditional Turkish/Kemalist foreign policy. The change has 
especially been through a more proactive form of foreign policy, which included 
stronger bilateral ties with its surrounding Muslim neighbours and a more 
multilateral approach to policymaking (Öniz & Yilmaz (2009, p. 20 & Akram (2010)) 
 
In my thesis, I have worked with two very specific periods of time. The period 
immediately after the Cold War (1990-2002) and the period in which AKP has been 
in government (2002-2011). Turkey’s reaction pattern during the Cold War and the 
period immediately after has best been explained through realism. During this 
period, little was done from the Turkish government to acknowledge and apply 
Turkey’s Muslim roots because Turkey as a state was still impacted by the anarchistic 
system, which realist theorists describe. This system dictated that Turkey followed 
NATO and its other Western allies, and there was little room for deviation because of 
the Soviet threat.  
 
However, after the Cold War ended, this Soviet threat was eliminated and the 
Turkish AKP government has begun moving Turkey in a different direction. Akram 
states: ‘Ankara remains on the path to reorientation of its foreign policy priorities in 
68 
 
the region and beyond’ (Akran (2010), p. 13). This reorientation can be explained by 
applying the constructivist theory framework. Especially Turkey’s decreasing 
relationship with Israel has been of interest. The lack of support and the strong 
dissociation with Israel has created doubts concerning Turkey’s loyalty towards the 
West, and it has therefore been a challenge for realist theorist to explain. I argue 
that this change is founded in Turkey’s reinvention of itself as being a Muslim 
country. The AKP has focused on relations with Muslim neighbours, branded Turkey 
as a Muslim country and some scholars even argue that the AKP is embracing 
Turkey’s Ottoman heritage (Linden et al (2012), p. 28).  
 
The changed foreign policy of the AKP has not been without controversy. From being 
a close ally of both Israel and the U.S., Turkey has begun to position itself differently 
than before. The continuing contact with Hamas and its increasing criticism of Israel 
has been controversial and surprising to most (Hale (2009), p. 157). The support 
from Iran, Palestine and other Muslim countries, which has been presented here, all 
indicate and deliver proof that this reinvention has succeeded. Moreover, the 
Turkish “no” to participate in the Iraq war of 2003 on American terms reveal that 
Turkey has again obtained the right to act unilaterally. Also, the Turkish initiatives to 
support Iran are a consequence of this independent Turkish decision-making process 
(Akram (2010)). Of course this unilateralism is not unconditional, however, the fact 
that it even exists would not be possible within the realism framework.  
 
In the analysis of the domestic environment I conclude that the election of AKP has 
had a major influence on Turkish foreign policy and that Turkey has changed 
substantially at the domestic level. Davutoğlu’s five concepts of foreign policy have 
changed the way Turkey adapts its foreign policy, and I argue that the use of these 
five concepts are rooted in ideology and can therefore be explained through 
constructivism. Realism can not explain the way AKP has affected Turkey’s “new” 
foreign policy, because it totally disproves the realist hypothesis of an anarchistic 
system, which disregards the influence of the individual state. 
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In the analysis of the regional environment I conclude that Turkey has changed its 
focus. Turkey is now much more focussed on its Muslim neighbours, and disregards 
it traditional relationship with Israel. I argue that this change is caused by the 
ideology of the AKP, who have introduced Turkey’s Muslim ideology. It is my 
argument that this focus on ideology can be explained through constructivism and 
the concept of intersubjectivity. To some extent, however, part of the shift can be 
explained through realism. Turkey aspiration to become a regional hegemon and the 
leader of the Muslim world is a pure a traditional realist argument and should as 
such be addressed as such. 
 
Finally, in the analysis of the systemic environment I conclude that Turkey has 
changed its attitude towards its global allies as a consequence of a change in the 
global setting. The end of the Cold War and the elimination of the Soviet threat have 
made it possible for Turkey to make unilateral decision, and become a global and 
regional player, without the support of the U.S. the decreasing need for U.S. support 
in Turkey is exemplified in the hesitation and the neglect to support the Americans in 
2003.  
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8. Perspective 
The declining relationship between Israel and the U.S. on one side and Turkey on the 
other is of great importance to the U.S. As this thesis has been arguing throughout, 
Turkey has decided to focus more on its Muslim neighbours since the end of the Cold 
War, and the Flotilla incident has not made the U.S., Israel and Turkey move any 
closer. The U.S. needs Turkey as a close ally in the region, and it is therefore 
interesting to see the American effort that has been made to restore relations 
between Israel and Turkey. 
 
Until now, Israel has ruled out an apology for the Flotilla crisis saying: ‘We don't have 
to apologize for the fact that naval commandos defended themselves against an 
assault by violent activists of the IHH’ and ‘We don’t have to apologize for acting to 
stop arms smuggling to Hamas, a terrorist organization that has already fired more 
than 10,000 missiles, rockets and mortar rounds at civilians’ (The Washington Post (5 
September 2011). On 22 March, 3 days before this thesis was submitted, Netanyahu 
made a remarkable turnaround on the issue when he apologized in a phone call to 
PM Erdogan (Fox News - 22 March 2013). The call was made during a visit to Israel 
by U.S. President Barack Obama who also participated in the call. 
 
This shows that the United States of America is willing to go a long way in order to 
restore it vital relationship with it Middle Eastern Allies, and it shows that the tables 
have turned so to speak. Throughout the Cold War, the American needs 
overshadowed Turkish needs; however, this turnaround by Israel shows that Turkey 
has strengthened its position in the relationship with the U.S.  
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